Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2017.1305769
International trade and strategic behaviour: a game theoretical analysis of the trade dispute between Turkey and Russia
Aslı Taşbaşı
orcid.org/0000-0002-9640-8582
Sažetak
Starting from the premise that strategic interactions between
countries influence trade policy decisions, this paper is a first attempt
at exploring the possible outcomes of a trade dispute between Turkey
and Russia, assuming that Turkey can lodge a complaint about Russia’s
protectionist move to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).
Employing the course of events during the recent economic conflict
between the two countries, the article models the stages of a trade
game wherein players exhibit non-cooperative behaviour. It finds
that Turkey reporting Russia to the DSB depends on the cost of the
dispute, which represents both economic losses and losses that can
be considered disadvantages in a broader sense. The results show that
in trade relations where asymmetric interdependence is observed,
if both parties mutually commit to an international organisation,
binding regulations may provide strategy options that are otherwise
infeasible for the disadvantaged player.
Ključne riječi
Turkey; Russia; trade dispute; trade policy; World Trade Organization
Hrčak ID:
180893
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.12.2017.
Posjeta: 1.303 *