Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.31192/np.16.1.1
The problem of intuition of morality in John Rawl’s philosophy
Marko Jakić
orcid.org/0000-0001-7643-855X
Sažetak
The article deals with the possible view point paradox in John Rawls’s philosophy. The introductory part critically outlines relevant contemporary theoretical views of the problem of the intuition of morality; with particular regard to direct intuitionism, relativism, and doctrinal moral pluralism. Rawls’ theoretical position has been extracted in the central part of the article together with the arguments in support of the assertion of his theoretical position as a foundationalist indirect intuitionism. Additional arguments in support of Rawls’ assertion of his principles of justice as the theoretical (ethical) higher principles have been analyzed. In conclusion, it has been shown that there is no view point paradox of the intuition of morality in his philosophy.
Ključne riječi
intuition; justice; fairness; equality; foundationalism
Hrčak ID:
196227
URI
Datum izdavanja:
22.3.2018.
Posjeta: 1.550 *