Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 37 No. 3, 2017.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi37308
Phenomenologies of Empty Intentionality
Mark Losoncz
orcid.org/0000-0001-7495-1122
; Univerzitet u Beogradu, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Kraljice Natalije 45, RS–11000 Beograd
Sažetak
This paper deals with the notion of empty intentionality, with special regard not only to Husserl’s works, but also to posthusserlian – classical and contemporary – phenomenologies. Attention is devoted to the typologies of empty intentionality. The author makes distinction between four aspects: 1. empty representation; 2. empty horizons of perception; 3. empty temporalization; 4. empty consciousness. It seems that the notion of empty intentionality is relevant for the understanding of the historical development of phenomenology, but also in the context of many
contemporary philosophical debates.
Ključne riječi
Edmund Husserl; phenomenology; intentionality; empty intentionality; time; representation; horizons
Hrčak ID:
196319
URI
Datum izdavanja:
23.11.2017.
Posjeta: 1.888 *