Izvorni znanstveni članak
THE POLICY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA DURING “EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES”
Davor Marijan
; Hrvatski institut za povijest, Zagreb, Hrvatska
Sažetak
The concept of “exceptional circumstances” appeared officially in the early 1980s in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ) and served as the basis for dealing with crises which threatened a part or the whole territory of the state. “Exceptional circumstances” reflects the position the League of Communists of Yugoslavia held concerning the necessity and means of protecting one-party communist rule, wherein the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) was given the role of defending the established order. At the end of the 1980s, as the SFRJ headed deep into crisis, “exceptional circumstances” became the most important theoretical problem the armed forces had to deal with as they considered their course of action. The army was lobbied to revise the way in which it determined what constituted a crisis and the steps it took to deal with “exceptional circumstances.” In order to proclaim the existence of “exceptional circumstances,” it was necessary to obtain an agreement between the Presidency of the SFRJ and the presidencies of the Socialist republics. The Autonomous Regions of the Socialist Republic of Serbia as well as the Socialist Republic of Montenegro were dealt with by the Serbian bloc under the policy of “developments among the peoples.” On the basis of later events, it is clear that the leaders of the armed forces began to synchronize their movements with the wishes of the Serbian political leadership. With the election of non-communist governments in Slovenia and Croatia, and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina, political forces came into power which the armed forces considered antithetical and which they associated for years with the “defeated class enemy,” and nationalism. To the ideologized leadership of the JNA there was no room for compromise with these forces, they considered this an incident of “exceptional circumstances” in the western parts of the country. Turning to its “natural ally,” pro-Serbian political forces in the JNA, the armed forces, beginning in early 1990 and especially after May, 1990, took measures against the newly elected, non-communist governments in the SFRJ, most extensively in Croatia. Strategically positioning itself toward the western parts of the country, the army disarmed the territorial defence forces and created the Zagreb Corps to put down unrest in that city, as well as developed plans between July and September of 1990 to topple the democratically elected government in the Republic of Croatia. In this regard the Army took into consideration timetables and the international situation, although due to its international isolation, it was unable to gauge the degree of support it had from foreign political elites. The Serbian minority in Croatia served as the nominal reason for dealing with the crisis according to the methods envisioned by the theory of “exceptional circumstances.” There were rough similarities to the events that took place in Kosovo in the early 1980s, but the circumstances were different. The Army sought to apply the lessons it had learned in Kosovo in the early 1980s and the preparations it had made for similar emergencies thereafter. After disarming the territorial defence forces, and thereby breaking cooperation with the ministry of internal affairs, the army determined how many troops it would need to guarantee order in Croatia. But in spite of its technological superiority and the tactical advantage derived from its self-appointed role of mediator or arbitrator in the crisis, the army’s strategy failed. Due to the massive unrest of the Serbian minority in Croatia from July and August of 1990, the conditions of “exceptional circumstances” which the army desired were deemed to exist. Given the unrest in all of Croatia, the army tried to take advantage of certain incidents, like the affair surrounding the illegal arming of the Croatian police, the disorder in Pakrac and the conflict at Plitvice. It seems the events in Pakrac were considered by the army its greatest failure. Thereafter, the army began to follow the plan for “exceptional circumstances” by isolating the Knin region and moving in forces from other republics to be used in an open war of revenge against Croatia after the conclusion of the war in Slovenia.
Ključne riječi
Hrčak ID:
161952
URI
Datum izdavanja:
14.10.2002.
Posjeta: 1.263 *