Filozofska istraživanja, Vol. 38 No. 3, 2018.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi38310
Aristotle's Psychological Conception of Meaning: παθήματα as ὁμοιώματα
Igor Martinjak
orcid.org/0000-0002-2726-4036
; Sveučilište u Zagrebu, Fakultet filozofije i religijskih znanosti, Jordanovac 110, HR-10000 Zagreb
Sažetak
In this paper, I investigate Aristotle's psychological conception of meaning. I will show that in Aristotle's De interpretatione we can find a conception of meaning that enables a response to typical objections such psychological accounts are facing with. According to my interpretation, it is required that thoughts are significata of our terms rather than mental images. Mental images could occur as subjective features of a particular mind in particular portion of time, whereas thoughts as an isomorphic likeness of the universal and necessary aspect of extramen¬tal reality provide ground for intersubjectivity required for an adequate account of meaning. In my interpretation, however reference is not fixed via likening relation because a mental content of nonreferring terms is also provided via likening relation between thought and two or many extramental things.
Ključne riječi
affections in the soul; thoughts; images; likenesses; extramental reality; meaning; reference
Hrčak ID:
215035
URI
Datum izdavanja:
13.11.2018.
Posjeta: 2.072 *