Izvorni znanstveni članak
Mario Mikolić
Sažetak
As early as 1941, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, or the Communist Party of Slovenia, decided to develop the National Liberation Movement and the National Liberation Struggle in Istria because of the ethnic composition there - a majority of Croatians and Slovenes — and due to the earlier mutual declaration (along with the Communist Party of Italy) on the struggle to ensure rights of national self-determination even to the point of secession. At the same time the CPY took into consideration the fact that from the viewpoint of International rights, Istria and the Slovenian Littoral were Italian territory, as well as the fact that a significant number of people with Italian ethnic background lived in this area. For that reason the CPY conducted a dialog with the Communist Party of Italy -which had organizations operating there, about possible cooperation in carrying on the National Liberation Movement. However, these efforts on the part of the CPY were rejected by the CPI. The CPI did not, in fact, reject the possibility of developing the armed struggle in its own territory, and it included Istria in this, but not in the time given and not with the goals and under the direction of the CPY. The misunderstanding to which this eventually led can be attributed primarily to the question of the two parties' jurisdiction over these areas and to whom the territory of Istria and the Slovenian Littoral belonged after the var. The CPY did in fact develop an armed rebellion with the goal of uniting this area with Yugoslavia, which the CPI did not accept as a priority aim in the struggle.
These atitudes were reflected in the organizations, and among individual members, of the CPI in Istria. When political workers in Istria, who were members of the Communist Party of Croatia, initiated a dialogue and meetings with representatives from the CPI in 1942 in order to develop a wide-ranging anti-fascist movement, they encountered the same attitudes. Only some individuals accepted cooperation in the armed struggle, but without the final goals -which the CPY had specified. Hence there arose accusations from both sides, of opportunism by the CPI and nationalism by the CPY (the Communist Party of Croatia and the Communist Party of Slovenia). Not until 1944 did they arrive at a mutual understanding on the united armed struggle against the German occupiers and Italian fascists, so that the armed forces which the CPI had formed in the Slovenian Littoral entered into the structure of the Yugoslav National Liberation Army. This resulted in a general political relationship with Italy at that time, and the cooperation of western allies with these armed forces. This agreement was reached in Istria in December, 1943, at the Istrian Party Consultation in which CPI representatives participated.
These developments do not indicate that there was a complete lack of cooperation between the two parties in this field. The raids in 1942, for example, at the Ampele Factory in Rovinj, were part of a previous agreement between representatives of both parties.
But because of the disunited position of the two parties, for example in Rovinj, a National Liberation Committee was not formed immediately after Italy's capitulation, but rather a Committee for Public Salvation, composed of people from all anti-fascist elements. For the same reasons the demonstrations which were organized in Pula on September 9, 1943, were unsuccessful. The populace did not want government power, but only weapons to fight the Germans. Fascist riflemen and naval cadets intervened, so that the demonstrations had a bloody end. At the same time, armed people throughout Istria destroyed the Italian government by force and established the National Liberation Organization.
For a clear understanding it is necessary to know that the CPY in 1941 developed an armed rebellion with a very clear program for social and national liberation, while the CPI at that time had no clear program. On the other hand, the CPI then was greatly weakened in terms of personnel (the leadership was abroad, and a large number of members were in prison and in camps), to be able to develop a resistence force independently. Nor was it able to accomplish this later because of the political constellation within anti-fascist forces with whom the CPI undersigned a united program. With regard to Istria, the political program of the Italian parties was a priori diametrically opposed to the program of the CPY. Had the CPI taken a different position, it would have been unable to accept the program of the remaining Italian anti-fascist parties without having negative consequences for itself in Italian political life. However, it is true that representatives of the CPI did not accept the position of the CPY with regard to Istria nor in mutual contacts. The CPY never wavered from its position and to the end collected its forces for the attainment of its proclaimed goals.
It is important to emphasize that political relations between the two parties were never broken. In fact, in 1944 the majority of Italians from this territory participated as equals in the National Liberation Movement and the National Liberation Struggle in the CPY's program. Those (although not all) who did not accept the unification of Istria with Yugoslavia emigrated to Italy only after the war. It is true that other factors influenced this, but they do not constitute the subject of this discussion.
Ključne riječi
Hrčak ID:
216336
URI
Datum izdavanja:
15.4.1975.
Posjeta: 1.309 *