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During the great economic crisis the volume of all international trade was lowered; all countries attempted to balance their imports and exports, so that Europe was covered with a veritable net of prohibitive measures: restrictions and import quotas, measures for control of foreign exchange, reciprocity in foreign trade, favoritism and preference for imports from those countries which purchased goods from some others, drastic limitations of imports and unlimited systems of control. Italy had a deficit in its foreign trade for a long time, but its losses were reclaimed by earnings from shipping transport, insurance, tourism, payments from emigrants, etc. During the economic crisis the supplemental earnings dropped and Italy needed to balance its foreign trade, and this meant cutting its imports drastically, particularly from Yugoslavia (although this was not a dominant factor in the Italian economy). Italian restrictions strongly affected Yugoslav exports-food, lumber, and stock. Rome also used political pressure in order to lower imports from Yugoslavia, but this political intensification did not determine trade. Yugoslavia, then tremendously affected by the crisis and falling prices of exported goods, fell into misfortune and political dissatisfaction, so that Italian political autarchy carried harsh consequences for it. A series of new, complementary Italian-Yugoslav agreements legalized the Italian limitation of imports. Yugoslavia futilely attempted to direct its agrarian exports to France and Czechoslovakia; France limited its imports of agrarian products, and Czechoslovakia even had a favorable balance of trade with Yugoslavia.
Thus Italy carried out its political action against Yugoslavia (»breaking up«) and with political autarchy limited imports from Yugoslavia. So for the Yugoslav regime and exporters Germany became more significant than ever (with whom King Alexander's regime had begun a »political flirtation« against Mussolini around 1927). Berlin ad Belgrade feared integrated plans in the Danube Valley (the Italian and Czechoslovakian bloc), and Germany in 1932 demonstrated that the French idea of eliminating German economic-political influence from the Danube Valley was illusory.
New Italian measures for attaining autarchy in 1934-35 cam at a time when Hitler's Germany was carrying out a plan to include the Southeast in the German »Grosswirtschaftsraum« and when Germany began to buy products on a massive scale from countries in the Southeast. So quite simply, Italy menaced Yugoslavia politically and limited its purchases of Yugoslav products, while Germany (especially after 1933), emphasized that it wanted the survival of the Yugoslav state and its regime, and at the same time was prepared to purchase Yugoslav agrarian surpluses. The result was that Yugoslavia, even before the economic sanctions against Italy (after October 1935), directed its exports to Germany.
The economic crisis, which decreased European trade, and Fascist Italy's politics of autarchy, dealt a sharp blow to Yugoslav exports which in the 1920's, a fourth of its capacity was going to neighboring Italy. Paris and Prague were unable to help and it was logical for Belgrade to look to Berlin, on which the Belgrade regime had counted for a long time as a potential supporter against Italy and its allies. Changes during the crisis period significantly effected a reorientation of Yugoslav foreign policy, which is commonly, but mistakenly, identified with the person of Prince Paul and the president of the government, Dr. Milan Stojadinović.
Ključne riječi
Hrčak ID:
216668
URI
Datum izdavanja:
15.6.1976.
Posjeta: 1.239 *