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Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine, Vol. 44. No. 2 (88), 2018.

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Helene Druskowitz on Free Will

Ivana Skuhala Karasman ; Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska

Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 314 Kb

str. 427-438

preuzimanja: 352

citiraj

Sažetak

In her work Wie ist Verantwortung und Zurechnung Annahme der Willensfreiheit möglich? Eine Untersuchung (How is Responsibility and Imputation Possible Without Acceptance of Free Will? An Investigation, 1887) Helene Druskowitz deals with freedom of will in the context of accountability and responsibility. Her position is in opposition to Kant's concept of transcendental freedom as the foundation for freedom and responsibility in action. Druskowitz rejects transcendental freedom, while retaining accountability and responsibility. She builds her understanding of freedom and responsibility partly on the philosophical arguments propounded by Arthur Schopenhauer and Paul Rée.

Ključne riječi

Helene Druskowitz; Immanuel Kant; Paul Rée; Arthur Schopenhauer, free will

Hrčak ID:

221359

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/221359

Datum izdavanja:

17.5.2019.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 934 *