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Professional paper
https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114

Judgmental Belief

Matjaž Potrč ; Filozofska fakulteta, Univerza v Ljubljani, Aškerčeva cesta 2, SI–1000 Ljubljana 

Fulltext: english, pdf (345 KB) pages 189-199 downloads: 70* cite
APA 6th Edition
Potrč, M. (2019). Judgmental Belief. Filozofska istraživanja, 39 (1), 189-199. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114
MLA 8th Edition
Potrč, Matjaž. "Judgmental Belief." Filozofska istraživanja, vol. 39, no. 1, 2019, pp. 189-199. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114. Accessed 2 Dec. 2020.
Chicago 17th Edition
Potrč, Matjaž. "Judgmental Belief." Filozofska istraživanja 39, no. 1 (2019): 189-199. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114
Harvard
Potrč, M. (2019). 'Judgmental Belief', Filozofska istraživanja, 39(1), pp. 189-199. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114
Vancouver
Potrč M. Judgmental Belief. Filozofska istraživanja [Internet]. 2019 [cited 2020 December 02];39(1):189-199. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114
IEEE
M. Potrč, "Judgmental Belief", Filozofska istraživanja, vol.39, no. 1, pp. 189-199, 2019. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114
Fulltext: croatian, pdf (345 KB) pages 189-199 downloads: 93* cite
APA 6th Edition
Potrč, M. (2019). Prosudbeno vjerovanje. Filozofska istraživanja, 39 (1), 189-199. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114
MLA 8th Edition
Potrč, Matjaž. "Prosudbeno vjerovanje." Filozofska istraživanja, vol. 39, no. 1, 2019, pp. 189-199. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114. Accessed 2 Dec. 2020.
Chicago 17th Edition
Potrč, Matjaž. "Prosudbeno vjerovanje." Filozofska istraživanja 39, no. 1 (2019): 189-199. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114
Harvard
Potrč, M. (2019). 'Prosudbeno vjerovanje', Filozofska istraživanja, 39(1), pp. 189-199. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114
Vancouver
Potrč M. Prosudbeno vjerovanje. Filozofska istraživanja [Internet]. 2019 [cited 2020 December 02];39(1):189-199. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114
IEEE
M. Potrč, "Prosudbeno vjerovanje", Filozofska istraživanja, vol.39, no. 1, pp. 189-199, 2019. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/fi39114

Abstracts
What is a belief? To answer this question, the reconstruction of belief-formation is attempted. It reveals the intertwining of two dimensions. At the upper end, there is the truth as the objective teleological goal of belief-formation. This goal is based upon a nested hierarchy of mutually supported sub-goals: objective evidence, transglobal reliability, one’s doxastic sensibility, and one’s all-in ultima facie doxastic seeming. The lower end of the hierarchy is subjective and deontic, whereas, in the middle, teleological and deontic elements intermingle. Belief-formation external or descriptive ingredients get disciplined through non-instrumental teleology and deontics. Teleology-deontics intertwining in belief-formation reveals that a belief shares several characteristics with genuine judgment: phenomenological basis, commitment, sensibility and responsibility. Teleology-deontics intertwining also characterises quasi-agentive account of intentionality. Belief, such as it is predominantly forthcoming in epistemology and ethics, provides a reduced version of the genuine judgment, so that it can comply with externalist and descriptivist agenda, doing away with teleology-deontics intertwining. Judgmental belief perspective is revived once as virtue epistemology, and virtue ethics obtain their support through one’s character.

Keywords
belief; genuine judgment; teleology; deontics; descriptivism

Hrčak ID: 224019

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/224019

[croatian]

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