APA 6th Edition Riley, J. (2008). What are Millian Qualitative Superiorities?. Prolegomena, 7 (1), 61-79. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/21433
MLA 8th Edition Riley, Jonathan. "What are Millian Qualitative Superiorities?." Prolegomena, vol. 7, br. 1, 2008, str. 61-79. https://hrcak.srce.hr/21433. Citirano 26.07.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition Riley, Jonathan. "What are Millian Qualitative Superiorities?." Prolegomena 7, br. 1 (2008): 61-79. https://hrcak.srce.hr/21433
Harvard Riley, J. (2008). 'What are Millian Qualitative Superiorities?', Prolegomena, 7(1), str. 61-79. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/21433 (Datum pristupa: 26.07.2021.)
Vancouver Riley J. What are Millian Qualitative Superiorities?. Prolegomena [Internet]. 2008 [pristupljeno 26.07.2021.];7(1):61-79. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/21433
IEEE J. Riley, "What are Millian Qualitative Superiorities?", Prolegomena, vol.7, br. 1, str. 61-79, 2008. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/21433. [Citirano: 26.07.2021.]
Sažetak In an article published in Prolegomena 2006, Christoph Schmidt-Petri has defended his interpretation and attacked mine of Mill’s idea that higher kinds of pleasure are superior in quality to lower kinds, regardless of quantity. Millian qualitative superiorities as I understand them are infinite superiorities. In this paper, I clarify my interpretation and show how Schmidt-Petri has misrepresented it and ignored the obvious textual support for it. As a result, he fails to understand how genuine Millian qualitative superiorities determine the novel structure of Mill’s pluralistic utilitarianism, in which a social code of justice that distributes equal rights and duties takes absolute priority over competing considerations. Schmidt-Petri’s own interpretation is a non-starter, because it does noteven recognize that Mill is talking about different kinds of pleasant feelings, such that the higher kinds are intrinsically more valuable than the lower. I conclude by outlining why my interpretation is free of any metaphysical commitment to the “essence” of pleasure.