Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.34075/sb.60.1.4
Truth in Aquinas, Mercier, and Zimmermann
Dario Škarica
orcid.org/0000-0002-6788-2242
; Institut za filozofiju - Zagreb; Filozofski fakultet - Sveuciliste u Splitu
Sažetak
The main topic of this paper is Thomas Aquinas's concept of truth, particularly his distinction between the truth of intellect (veritas intellectus) and the truth of things (veritas rerum). Here, veritas intellectus (logical truth) is considered in its full sense, i. e., not only as mere correspondence of judgements to their objects, but also as the natural aim of judgements and within its own natural aim, which is knowledge. Within this discussion, some thoughts are presented concerning the nature of judgement, which are considerably permeated with Thomas's distinction between practical and speculative knowledge. Next, Thomas's term veritas rerum is proven to encompass two rather different notions of truth, the first being the notion of objective truth, referring to things as objects of our judgements and norms of their truth, and the second being the notion of ontological truth, referring to things insofar as they reflect divine ideas as their exemplar causes and norms of their reality. Finally, Mercier's and Zimmermann's secularization of Thomas's concept of truth is identified and shown to be essentially provisional in character.
Ključne riječi
Thomas Aquinas; Désiré-Joseph Mercier; Stjepan Zimmermann; logical truth; objective truth; ontological truth; judgement.
Hrčak ID:
234890
URI
Datum izdavanja:
1.3.2020.
Posjeta: 1.257 *