Izvorni znanstveni članak
On Some Conceptual and Explanatory Difficulties of Evolutionary Ethics
Tomislav Bracanović
Sažetak
In the article it is argued that contemporary evolutionary ethics – to the extent it accepts sociobiological strategies of naturalizing human morality – faces some serious conceptual and explanatory difficulties. Conceptual difficulty consists in recognizing that “morality” is not the same as “altruism”, but rather comprises several specific elements which distinguish it from both evolutionary and psychological altruism. Explanatory difficulty consists in recognizing that the phenomenon of morality appropriately conceptualized cannot be incorporated into standard sociobiological explanations without endangering some basic assumptions of those explanations, primarily the assumption of “gene selectionism”, as well as the assumption of “evolutionarily stable strategies” (ESS). The basic argument is that one cannot retain both the appropriate concept (description) of human morality and key assumptions of sociobiological explanations.
Ključne riječi
Evolutionary ethics; sociobiology; evolutionary altruism; psychological altruism; morality; objectifying morality; internalization of norms; gene selectionism; evolutionarily stable strategy
Hrčak ID:
166
URI
Datum izdavanja:
7.6.2005.
Posjeta: 2.206 *