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Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.1

Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia

Işık Sarıhan   ORCID icon orcid.org/0000-0002-1299-4597 ; Central European University

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (429 KB) str. 5-32 preuzimanja: 207* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Sarıhan, I. (2020). Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 16 (1), 5-32. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.1
MLA 8th Edition
Sarıhan, Işık. "Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 16, br. 1, 2020, str. 5-32. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.1. Citirano 17.09.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Sarıhan, Işık. "Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16, br. 1 (2020): 5-32. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.1
Harvard
Sarıhan, I. (2020). 'Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 16(1), str. 5-32. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.1
Vancouver
Sarıhan I. Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2020 [pristupljeno 17.09.2021.];16(1):5-32. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.1
IEEE
I. Sarıhan, "Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.16, br. 1, str. 5-32, 2020. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.1

Sažetak
Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non-representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states of a certain kind, which I call “automatically non-endorsed representations”, experiential states the veridicality of which we are almost never committed to, and which do not trigger explicit belief or disbelief in the mind of the subject. By investigating descriptive accounts of afterimages by two qualia theorists, I speculate that the mistaken claims of some anti-representationalists might be rooted in confusing two senses of the term “seeming”.

Ključne riječi
Perception; representationalism; qualia; non-conceptual content; afterimages; double vision

Hrčak ID: 238179

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/238179

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Posjeta: 561 *