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https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.2

Knowledge and Assertion: A Critique of Lackey

Joshua Anderson   ORCID icon orcid.org/0000-0002-3621-9771 ; Virginia State University

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (368 KB) str. 33-52 preuzimanja: 128* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Anderson, J. (2020). Knowledge and Assertion: A Critique of Lackey. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 16 (1), 33-52. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.2
MLA 8th Edition
Anderson, Joshua. "Knowledge and Assertion: A Critique of Lackey." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol. 16, br. 1, 2020, str. 33-52. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.2. Citirano 24.09.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Anderson, Joshua. "Knowledge and Assertion: A Critique of Lackey." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16, br. 1 (2020): 33-52. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.2
Harvard
Anderson, J. (2020). 'Knowledge and Assertion: A Critique of Lackey', European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 16(1), str. 33-52. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.2
Vancouver
Anderson J. Knowledge and Assertion: A Critique of Lackey. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy [Internet]. 2020 [pristupljeno 24.09.2021.];16(1):33-52. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.2
IEEE
J. Anderson, "Knowledge and Assertion: A Critique of Lackey", European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, vol.16, br. 1, str. 33-52, 2020. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.16.1.2

Sažetak
In the literature on assertion, there is a common assumption that having the knowledge that p is a sufficient condition for having the epistemic right to assert that p—call this the Knowledge is Sufficient for Assertion Principle, or KSA. Jennifer Lackey has challenged KSA based on several counterexamples that all, roughly, involve isolated secondhand knowledge. In this article, I argue that Lackey’s counterexamples fail to be convincing because her intuition that the agent in her counterexamples both has knowledge and do not have the epistemic right to assert is wrong. The article will progress as follows: In section 2, I present Lackey’s argument. In section 3, I suggest some more general reasons for doubting that the agent in her counterexamples actually has knowledge. I then show that from a virtue theoretic and Edward Craig’s practical explication of knowledge perspectives the agent in Lackey’ s counterexamples does not know. Since the agent in Lackey’s counterexamples does not have knowledge, she has failed to convincingly prove that KSA is false. In section 4, I conclude by suggesting that, at most, what Lackey’s counterexamples demonstrate is a problem with a simplistic evidentialist and/or process reliabilist epistemology.

Ključne riječi
Assertion; Jennifer Lackey; secondhand knowledge; virtue epistemology

Hrčak ID: 238229

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/238229

[hrvatski]

Posjeta: 358 *