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https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35110

Wang Yangming’s Notions of Primary Knowledge and Primary Ability

Margus Ott ; Tallinn University, Uus 21-3, EE–10111 Tallinn


Puni tekst: hrvatski pdf 605 Kb

str. 195-195

preuzimanja: 121

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Puni tekst: engleski pdf 605 Kb

str. 173-196

preuzimanja: 523

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Puni tekst: francuski pdf 605 Kb

str. 196-196

preuzimanja: 79

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Puni tekst: njemački pdf 605 Kb

str. 196-196

preuzimanja: 88

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Sažetak

The paper first establishes that Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 (1472–1529) notion of primary knowledge (liangzhi 良知) does not entail subjective idealism but is rather related to the transcendental subjectivity in the phenomenological sense. Then, the paper discusses the question of whether Wang also has the concept of primary ability (liangneng 良能). The paper argues that it can be seen in two central topics of Wang: “knowledge and action are one” (zhixing heyi 知行合一) and “regarding Heaven and Earth and myriad things as one (rhizomatic) body” (以天地萬物為一體) or considering them as “originally one with my (rhizomatic) body” (本吾一體). It is shown how primary knowledge and ability are two aspects of the same phenomenon. It is true on the level of the virtual “rhizomatic body” (ti 體), not on the level of things considered as fully formed and actualized (xing 形), as they appear in the empirical mind, clouded by desires (yu 欲) that become fixated on the level of the actual. These desires can be discarded by the “extension of (primary) knowledge” zhi (liang)zhi 致(良)知. A parallel concept of “extension of (primary) ability” (zhi liangneng 致 良能), not used by Wang Yangming, could be added to the system.

Ključne riječi

Wang Yangming; Chinese philosophy; intentionality; liangzhi; primary knowledge; primary ability; anthropocentrism; intersubjectivity

Hrčak ID:

246335

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/246335

Datum izdavanja:

24.9.2020.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski francuski njemački

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