Izvorni znanstveni članak
THE ETHICS OF DOPING: BETWEEN PATERNALISM AND DUTY
Evangelos Protopapadakis
orcid.org/0000-0001-7502-3117
; NKUA Applied Philosophy Research Laboratory; UNESCO Chair in Bioethics (Haifa), Greek unit
Sažetak
The most plausible line of anti-doping argumentation starts with the fact that
performance enhancing substances are harmful and put at considerable risk the
health and the life of those who indulge in the overwhelming promises these
substances hold. From a liberal point of view, however, this is not a strong reason
neither to morally reject doping altogether, nor to put a blanket ban on it; on
the contrary, allowing adult, competent and informed athletes to have access to
performance enhancement drugs is often showcased as a liberty-related right of
noninterference. In this article I will first discuss doping from the liberal point
of view, especially in the light of the harm principle as it was introduced by Mill
and elaborated by his successors, most notably by Joel Feinberg. Then I will
examine whether – and to what degree – one’s decision to receive performance
enhancement drugs would mean to use humanity in one’s own person only as a
means, which would be self-defeating in the light of Kantian ethics. From this I
will move one step backwards to what I consider as the core question concerning
the ethics of doping, the one that is logically prior to any other in my view, and
concerns the consistency of the thesis that doping may be compatible with sport.
I will argue that there is an inherent logical antinomy between doing sport and
using performance enhancement drugs, one that presents any argumentation in
favor of doping as essentially self-contradictory.
Ključne riječi
ethics; doping: liberty; right of noninterference; paternalism; normative utilitarianism; duty; categorical imperative; harm principle
Hrčak ID:
248491
URI
Datum izdavanja:
6.12.2020.
Posjeta: 1.211 *