APA 6th Edition Berčić, B. (2008). Etika vrlina. Filozofska istraživanja, 28 (1), 193-207. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/23154
MLA 8th Edition Berčić, Boran. "Etika vrlina." Filozofska istraživanja, vol. 28, br. 1, 2008, str. 193-207. https://hrcak.srce.hr/23154. Citirano 29.03.2020.
Chicago 17th Edition Berčić, Boran. "Etika vrlina." Filozofska istraživanja 28, br. 1 (2008): 193-207. https://hrcak.srce.hr/23154
Harvard Berčić, B. (2008). 'Etika vrlina', Filozofska istraživanja, 28(1), str. 193-207. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/23154 (Datum pristupa: 29.03.2020.)
Vancouver Berčić B. Etika vrlina. Filozofska istraživanja [Internet]. 2008 [pristupljeno 29.03.2020.];28(1):193-207. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/23154
IEEE B. Berčić, "Etika vrlina", Filozofska istraživanja, vol.28, br. 1, str. 193-207, 2008. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/23154. [Citirano: 29.03.2020.]
Sažetak In this article author criticaly examines the key elements of the virtue ethics. He rejects common claim that that virtue ethics is better because it is self-regarding while deontology and consequentalism are other-regarding; within deontology there are duties toward oneself, consequentialism is symmetrical in this respect because my own good counts just as anybody’s else’s good, moreover, crucial virtues are other-regarding. Although, there is a kind of situation that supports this claim, namely, within consequentialist framework man who makes others produce 5 units of good is better than the man who himself produces 3 units, while within the framework of the virtue ethics the second one is better. It is very interesting question which one is better man period. Further, it is questionable whether virtue ethics can better accomodate the fact that we have moral raw models, namely, we admire them because of their actions and this fact much better fits into deontological or consequentialist framework. Also, since we can not specify a virtue independently of the actions it typically brings about, our admiration to virtues ammounts to our admiration to actions. This insight supports the general claim of the paper that virtues are reducible to actions, that is, that virtue ethics can not stand on its own because it is reducible to deontology or consequentialism.