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Prethodno priopćenje
https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210

Sceptical Doubts – Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?

Jelena Pavličić ; University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy, Čika-Ljubina 18–20, Molerova 86, RS–11000 Belgrade

Puni tekst: engleski, pdf (423 KB) str. 453-469 preuzimanja: 17* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Pavličić, J. (2020). Sceptical Doubts – Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?. Synthesis philosophica, 35 (2), 453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
MLA 8th Edition
Pavličić, Jelena. "Sceptical Doubts – Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 35, br. 2, 2020, str. 453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210. Citirano 15.04.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Pavličić, Jelena. "Sceptical Doubts – Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?." Synthesis philosophica 35, br. 2 (2020): 453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Harvard
Pavličić, J. (2020). 'Sceptical Doubts – Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?', Synthesis philosophica, 35(2), str. 453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Vancouver
Pavličić J. Sceptical Doubts – Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2020 [pristupljeno 15.04.2021.];35(2):453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
IEEE
J. Pavličić, "Sceptical Doubts – Raising the Standards or Changing the Angle?", Synthesis philosophica, vol.35, br. 2, str. 453-469, 2020. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Puni tekst: hrvatski, pdf (423 KB) str. 453-469 preuzimanja: 8* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Pavličić, J. (2020). Skeptičke sumnje – podizati standard ili mijenjati kut?. Synthesis philosophica, 35 (2), 453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
MLA 8th Edition
Pavličić, Jelena. "Skeptičke sumnje – podizati standard ili mijenjati kut?." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 35, br. 2, 2020, str. 453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210. Citirano 15.04.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Pavličić, Jelena. "Skeptičke sumnje – podizati standard ili mijenjati kut?." Synthesis philosophica 35, br. 2 (2020): 453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Harvard
Pavličić, J. (2020). 'Skeptičke sumnje – podizati standard ili mijenjati kut?', Synthesis philosophica, 35(2), str. 453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Vancouver
Pavličić J. Skeptičke sumnje – podizati standard ili mijenjati kut?. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2020 [pristupljeno 15.04.2021.];35(2):453-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
IEEE
J. Pavličić, "Skeptičke sumnje – podizati standard ili mijenjati kut?", Synthesis philosophica, vol.35, br. 2, str. 453-469, 2020. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Puni tekst: francuski, pdf (423 KB) str. 469-469 preuzimanja: 7* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Pavličić, J. (2020). Doute sceptique – élever le standard ou changer d’angle. Synthesis philosophica, 35 (2), 469-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
MLA 8th Edition
Pavličić, Jelena. "Doute sceptique – élever le standard ou changer d’angle." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 35, br. 2, 2020, str. 469-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210. Citirano 15.04.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Pavličić, Jelena. "Doute sceptique – élever le standard ou changer d’angle." Synthesis philosophica 35, br. 2 (2020): 469-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Harvard
Pavličić, J. (2020). 'Doute sceptique – élever le standard ou changer d’angle', Synthesis philosophica, 35(2), str. 469-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Vancouver
Pavličić J. Doute sceptique – élever le standard ou changer d’angle. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2020 [pristupljeno 15.04.2021.];35(2):469-469. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
IEEE
J. Pavličić, "Doute sceptique – élever le standard ou changer d’angle", Synthesis philosophica, vol.35, br. 2, str. 469-469, 2020. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Puni tekst: njemački, pdf (423 KB) str. 468-468 preuzimanja: 7* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Pavličić, J. (2020). Skeptische Zweifel – Standard anheben oder Blickwinkel ändern?. Synthesis philosophica, 35 (2), 468-468. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
MLA 8th Edition
Pavličić, Jelena. "Skeptische Zweifel – Standard anheben oder Blickwinkel ändern?." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 35, br. 2, 2020, str. 468-468. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210. Citirano 15.04.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Pavličić, Jelena. "Skeptische Zweifel – Standard anheben oder Blickwinkel ändern?." Synthesis philosophica 35, br. 2 (2020): 468-468. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Harvard
Pavličić, J. (2020). 'Skeptische Zweifel – Standard anheben oder Blickwinkel ändern?', Synthesis philosophica, 35(2), str. 468-468. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
Vancouver
Pavličić J. Skeptische Zweifel – Standard anheben oder Blickwinkel ändern?. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2020 [pristupljeno 15.04.2021.];35(2):468-468. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210
IEEE
J. Pavličić, "Skeptische Zweifel – Standard anheben oder Blickwinkel ändern?", Synthesis philosophica, vol.35, br. 2, str. 468-468, 2020. [Online]. https://doi.org/10.21464/sp35210

Sažetak
The goal of this paper is to explore two different accounts of the mechanisms by which epistemic standards change, as a basis for the explanation of how arguments for radical scepticism get their appearance of legitimacy and persuasive power. The discussion begins with a presentation of arguments for the view that our epistemic practice contains a mechanism that raises the epistemic standards, to illustrate how sceptical hypotheses pose challenges to the truth value of our ordinary knowledge claims. Then, the discussion moves to a critique aimed to show that raising the standards approach is not well-suited to the job because it does not truly account for the radical form of philosophical scepticism. We take that these arguments pose serious problems with raising the standards approach and have to be dealt with. We examine an alternative account of changing epistemic standards, changing the angle of scrutiny, in line with which epistemic standards are interpreted as conditioned by disciplinary fields within which we conduct our research. After that, we compare the two highlighted approaches based on their success in providing an adequate description of actual epistemic practice. We conclude by arguing in favour of a latter approach as a superior conception and also as a promissory framework for an explanation of the phenomenology of our involvement with philosophical scepticism. Finally, we will close with some questions for both accounts.

Ključne riječi
epistemic standards; level of scrutiny; knowledge claims; angle of scrutiny

Hrčak ID: 254038

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/254038

[hrvatski] [francuski] [njemački]

Posjeta: 92 *