APA 6th Edition Vorländer, H. (2001). Ustav kao simbol i instrument. Politička misao, 38 (4), 53-61. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/24365
MLA 8th Edition Vorländer, Hans. "Ustav kao simbol i instrument." Politička misao, vol. 38, br. 4, 2001, str. 53-61. https://hrcak.srce.hr/24365. Citirano 25.09.2020.
Chicago 17th Edition Vorländer, Hans. "Ustav kao simbol i instrument." Politička misao 38, br. 4 (2001): 53-61. https://hrcak.srce.hr/24365
Harvard Vorländer, H. (2001). 'Ustav kao simbol i instrument', Politička misao, 38(4), str. 53-61. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/24365 (Datum pristupa: 25.09.2020.)
Vancouver Vorländer H. Ustav kao simbol i instrument. Politička misao [Internet]. 2001 [pristupljeno 25.09.2020.];38(4):53-61. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/24365
IEEE H. Vorländer, "Ustav kao simbol i instrument", Politička misao, vol.38, br. 4, str. 53-61, 2001. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/24365. [Citirano: 25.09.2020.]
Sažetak The author holds that the constitutional theory today is put to the test in three areas. The first is the problem of the relationship between the trans-national regimes and the government institutions. The constitutional/legal theory is faced with the question how the norms concerning trans-national regimes can acquire the dignity of legal norms via “constitutionalization”. The second challenge is posed by trans-national regimes sui generis such as the EU’s legal system. The third concerns the process of EU’s expansion. For the author, a constitution is both an instrument and a symbol i.e. it is doubly coded. On the one hand, it leans on practice and instrumental implementation, and on the other on the world of representation. There are different types of constitutions. Type one are constitutions-manifests, largely solely symbolically coded. Type two are the constitutions in the form of contracts, structured more in the form of a legal relationship between discrete actors than a monolithic symbolic corpus. Type three are programmatic or planned constitutions, and they are associated with the rise and fall of socialist societies. They identify the already politically defined developmental goals. And finally, there are the so-called constitutions-cum-laws. These are a result of a regular legislative process that enables peoples in the capacity of presumed agents of sovereignty to debate constitutions and accept them. The author’s opinion is that the transition of Central- and East-European countries is a transition from the simple-coded with the primacy of the symbolic to the double-coded constitutions. This transition is not smooth. The first difficulty lies in “transplanting” constitutional solutions to different social/historical contexts. The other refers to the anti-constitutional mentality that prevails in these societies. Despite everything, the constitutional balance in Central and Eastern Europe is satisfactory on the whole. The constitutions of these countries are interesting because of three symbolic aspects. The first refers to the constitution formation processes in which these societies ceased to be objects of authoritarian rulers. The second aspect regards the search for new forms of identity and unity. The third aspect refers to the attempts to banish tyranny from politics and social life by means of legal chains.