APA 6th Edition WRATHALL, M.A. (2005). NON-RATIONAL GROUNDS AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT. Synthesis philosophica, 20 (2), 265-278. Retrieved from https://hrcak.srce.hr/2418
MLA 8th Edition WRATHALL, MARK A.. "NON-RATIONAL GROUNDS AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 20, no. 2, 2005, pp. 265-278. https://hrcak.srce.hr/2418. Accessed 16 Jun. 2021.
Chicago 17th Edition WRATHALL, MARK A.. "NON-RATIONAL GROUNDS AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT." Synthesis philosophica 20, no. 2 (2005): 265-278. https://hrcak.srce.hr/2418
Harvard WRATHALL, M.A. (2005). 'NON-RATIONAL GROUNDS AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT', Synthesis philosophica, 20(2), pp. 265-278. Available at: https://hrcak.srce.hr/2418 (Accessed 16 June 2021)
Vancouver WRATHALL MA. NON-RATIONAL GROUNDS AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2005 [cited 2021 June 16];20(2):265-278. Available from: https://hrcak.srce.hr/2418
IEEE M.A. WRATHALL, "NON-RATIONAL GROUNDS AND NON-CONCEPTUAL CONTENT", Synthesis philosophica, vol.20, no. 2, pp. 265-278, 2005. [Online]. Available: https://hrcak.srce.hr/2418. [Accessed: 16 June 2021]
Abstracts The phenomenological tradition has long contended that natural perception is neither conceptually articulated nor governed by deterministic laws, but rather organized according to the practically articulated structure of bodily being-in-the-world. But this leaves the problem of explaining how perception can provide justificatory support to thought. The phenomenologists’ answer is to say that the meaningful (but not conceptual) structure of natural perception makes it possible for us to think about objects by motivating particular thoughts about the objects as they present themselves in perception. I show how this view provides a way out of worries that plague contemporary philosophy of mind.