APA 6th Edition ZAHAVI, D. (2005). INTENTIONALITY AND EXPERIENCE. Synthesis philosophica, 20 (2), 299-318. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/2423
MLA 8th Edition ZAHAVI, DAN. "INTENTIONALITY AND EXPERIENCE." Synthesis philosophica, vol. 20, br. 2, 2005, str. 299-318. https://hrcak.srce.hr/2423. Citirano 20.10.2019.
Chicago 17th Edition ZAHAVI, DAN. "INTENTIONALITY AND EXPERIENCE." Synthesis philosophica 20, br. 2 (2005): 299-318. https://hrcak.srce.hr/2423
Harvard ZAHAVI, D. (2005). 'INTENTIONALITY AND EXPERIENCE', Synthesis philosophica, 20(2), str. 299-318. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/2423 (Datum pristupa: 20.10.2019.)
Vancouver ZAHAVI D. INTENTIONALITY AND EXPERIENCE. Synthesis philosophica [Internet]. 2005 [pristupljeno 20.10.2019.];20(2):299-318. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/2423
IEEE D. ZAHAVI, "INTENTIONALITY AND EXPERIENCE", Synthesis philosophica, vol.20, br. 2, str. 299-318, 2005. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/2423. [Citirano: 20.10.2019.]
Sažetak Since the publication of Chalmer’s influential work, The Conscious Mind (1996), it has been customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and the first-person perspective, the ‘easy problems of consciousness’ mainly concern the notion of intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking the experiential dimension into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the nature of subjectivity and experience if we ignore intentionality, or do we not run the risk of thereby reinstating a Cartesian subject-world dualism that ignores everything captured by the phrase “being-in-the-world”? In my article, I will inquire whether phenomenal consciousness and intentionality are two sides of the same coin that cannot be separated without committing a fallacy of division.