APA 6th Edition Sadkovich, J.J. (2008). Franjo Tuđman i problem stvaranja hrvatske države. Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 40 (1), 177-194. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/27114
MLA 8th Edition Sadkovich, James J.. "Franjo Tuđman i problem stvaranja hrvatske države." Časopis za suvremenu povijest, vol. 40, br. 1, 2008, str. 177-194. https://hrcak.srce.hr/27114. Citirano 25.05.2019.
Chicago 17th Edition Sadkovich, James J.. "Franjo Tuđman i problem stvaranja hrvatske države." Časopis za suvremenu povijest 40, br. 1 (2008): 177-194. https://hrcak.srce.hr/27114
Harvard Sadkovich, J.J. (2008). 'Franjo Tuđman i problem stvaranja hrvatske države', Časopis za suvremenu povijest, 40(1), str. 177-194. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/27114 (Datum pristupa: 25.05.2019.)
Vancouver Sadkovich JJ. Franjo Tuđman i problem stvaranja hrvatske države. Časopis za suvremenu povijest [Internet]. 2008 [pristupljeno 25.05.2019.];40(1):177-194. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/27114
IEEE J.J. Sadkovich, "Franjo Tuđman i problem stvaranja hrvatske države", Časopis za suvremenu povijest, vol.40, br. 1, str. 177-194, 2008. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/27114. [Citirano: 25.05.2019.]
Sažetak Revision of what has been written down and copied previously is a normal activity for historians. It is also a contentious activity. But it is a necessary one if we are to correct the errors that necessarily inform current history, which, to quote Mark Pinson, is “history writing under the sign of present development rather than more conventional academic history.” The purpose of this article is to identify some of the obstacles Franjo Tuđman and his government faced in their efforts to create a Croatian state and to suggest a few revisions to what has been written and copied over the past fifteen years. Theories that Tuđman pursued a “two-track” policy or that he conspired with Slobodan Milošević to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of his ideological beliefs, his policies, and the realities of the 1990s in which
he was forced to operate. Tuđman consistently sought to reassure Croatia’s Serbs and to cooperate with them, but he was not willing to cede a quarter of his country to Serb rebels. He also sought to protect Croats outside Croatia and to bring home members of the Croatian diaspora, but he did not conspire to destroy Bosnia and Herzegovina. His ideal was a Croatia which would embrace as many Croats as possible, but he pursued a practical political ideal and tailored his policies to fit the requirements of the international community. Tuđman declared his major goals to be the creation of a sovereign Croatia and its reintegration into Europe, and he identified the obstacles to realizing those goals. He was aware that as a small country, Croatia could not dictate the course of events, so he sought to formulate contingency policies which his government could adopt to respond to those of other actors. The obstacles and their importance constantly shifted as other actors sought to realize their goals or adopted new positions. But Tuđman consistently sought to work with domestic leaders, regional leaders, and the international community, first to find ways to avoid civil war, then to find ways to end the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. A dispassionate analysis of his policies suggests that Tuđman preferred diplomacy and undertook military action reluctantly.