Synthesis philosophica, Vol. 23 No. 1, 2008.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
Reality Check: On the Solvability of the Realism/Constructivism Dispute in Ontology
Joško Žanić
; Zagreb, Hrvatska
Sažetak
In the introduction the paper presents, based on the work of Michael Devitt, the conflicting ontological positions of Realism and Constructivism. The former insists on the independence of the nature of the world from our conceptual apparatus, language or scientific theories, whereas the latter affirms its dependence. The central part of the paper is concerned with showing that the Realism/Constructivism dispute is unsolvable by way of a thought experiment followed by refutation of the arguments of key constructivists (Kant, Goodman) and realists (Devitt, Boghossian). The views of Hilary Putnam are also briefly assessed and rejected. In conclusion it is argued, partly with recourse to Carnap’s arguments, that the dispute cannot be resolved, that it is a kind of Kantian antinomy, and that being a realist or a constructivist is therefore a matter of decision. In the course of the article a view is also expressed with regard to the nature of philosophy.
Ključne riječi
Realism; Constructivism; Worldmaking; reality; solvability; ontology; semantics; Michael Devitt
Hrčak ID:
30805
URI
Datum izdavanja:
23.7.2008.
Posjeta: 2.432 *