APA 6th Edition Caratan, B. (1999). NATO i Kosovo: Geneza problema i mogućnosti rješavanja krize. Politička misao, 36 (2), 3-14. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/32013
MLA 8th Edition Caratan, Branko. "NATO i Kosovo: Geneza problema i mogućnosti rješavanja krize." Politička misao, vol. 36, br. 2, 1999, str. 3-14. https://hrcak.srce.hr/32013. Citirano 24.09.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition Caratan, Branko. "NATO i Kosovo: Geneza problema i mogućnosti rješavanja krize." Politička misao 36, br. 2 (1999): 3-14. https://hrcak.srce.hr/32013
Harvard Caratan, B. (1999). 'NATO i Kosovo: Geneza problema i mogućnosti rješavanja krize', Politička misao, 36(2), str. 3-14. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/32013 (Datum pristupa: 24.09.2021.)
Vancouver Caratan B. NATO i Kosovo: Geneza problema i mogućnosti rješavanja krize. Politička misao [Internet]. 1999 [pristupljeno 24.09.2021.];36(2):3-14. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/32013
IEEE B. Caratan, "NATO i Kosovo: Geneza problema i mogućnosti rješavanja krize", Politička misao, vol.36, br. 2, str. 3-14, 1999. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/32013. [Citirano: 24.09.2021.]
Sažetak The author analyses the genesis and the scenarios of the Kosovo crisis resolution, as well as the possible political reverberations of the NATO military intervention. The premise is that the Kosovo crisis is only a continuation of the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, that Kosovo has for centuries been a separate entity largely populated by Albanians, that the policy of Serbian nationalism has permanently discriminated against the Albanian population and that prior to the recent air strikes against Yugoslavia Serbia had systematically led an ethniccleansing campaign on Kosovo. Although the author recognises that the support for the NATO military action can hardly be found in the tenets of the UN Charter, he argues that it can nevertheless be justified by international law. He points out that NATO’s military campaign enjoyed a broad support of the people of NATO member countries, but that it has made a rift in the European left. The new left was in the forefront of the action, while the old, dogmatic and sectarian left, found itself in the ranks of its most vocal opponents. The author claims that Milošević, with his overall politics, and particularly his policy on Kosovo, had propelled the West into an action it could not extricate itself from. He concludes that the consequences of Belgrade’s defeat will be: 1. The collapse of Milošević’ regime (the beginning of his end) 2. The final incapacitation of Milošević’ politics to create new conflicts, 3. The protectorate over Kosovo and its autonomy, with a factual independence from Serbia 4. The independence of Montenegro 5. Reinforcing the Dayton policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (eliminating centrifugal tendencies), 6. The organised participation of the West in the transitional processes in this region (The Pact on the stability of southeast Europe), 7. Bolstering the democratic and weakening the undemocratic tendencies in the region.