APA 6th Edition Vidmar, I. (2008). Jučer, danas, sutra. Filozofska istraživanja, 28 (4), 897-912. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/37069
MLA 8th Edition Vidmar, Iris. "Jučer, danas, sutra." Filozofska istraživanja, vol. 28, br. 4, 2008, str. 897-912. https://hrcak.srce.hr/37069. Citirano 18.06.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition Vidmar, Iris. "Jučer, danas, sutra." Filozofska istraživanja 28, br. 4 (2008): 897-912. https://hrcak.srce.hr/37069
Harvard Vidmar, I. (2008). 'Jučer, danas, sutra', Filozofska istraživanja, 28(4), str. 897-912. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/37069 (Datum pristupa: 18.06.2021.)
Vancouver Vidmar I. Jučer, danas, sutra. Filozofska istraživanja [Internet]. 2008 [pristupljeno 18.06.2021.];28(4):897-912. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/37069
IEEE I. Vidmar, "Jučer, danas, sutra", Filozofska istraživanja, vol.28, br. 4, str. 897-912, 2008. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/37069. [Citirano: 18.06.2021.]
Sažetak The feeling of the flow of time is undetachably connected to the way we experience time and think about it. There are, however, some theories that offer a different account of time, claiming that the feeling of its flow is nothing but our own subjective category that in no way corresponds to the real nature of time. Time neither flows nor passes, it just is, equally real in all of its wholeness at once. These theories, properly called eternalist theories, deny the special status that has traditionaly been attributed to the present as the only real slice of time and they instead claim that past and future are just as real. In this paper I confront these two stands and sum up the main footholds and issues of eternalism and it rival, presentist theories.