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Prethodno priopćenje

Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow

Iris Vidmar ; University of Rijeka, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Rijeka, Croatia

Puni tekst: hrvatski, pdf (424 KB) str. 897-912 preuzimanja: 674* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Vidmar, I. (2008). Jučer, danas, sutra. Filozofska istraživanja, 28 (4), 897-912. Preuzeto s
MLA 8th Edition
Vidmar, Iris. "Jučer, danas, sutra." Filozofska istraživanja, vol. 28, br. 4, 2008, str. 897-912. Citirano 18.06.2021.
Chicago 17th Edition
Vidmar, Iris. "Jučer, danas, sutra." Filozofska istraživanja 28, br. 4 (2008): 897-912.
Vidmar, I. (2008). 'Jučer, danas, sutra', Filozofska istraživanja, 28(4), str. 897-912. Preuzeto s: (Datum pristupa: 18.06.2021.)
Vidmar I. Jučer, danas, sutra. Filozofska istraživanja [Internet]. 2008 [pristupljeno 18.06.2021.];28(4):897-912. Dostupno na:
I. Vidmar, "Jučer, danas, sutra", Filozofska istraživanja, vol.28, br. 4, str. 897-912, 2008. [Online]. Dostupno na: [Citirano: 18.06.2021.]

The feeling of the flow of time is undetachably connected to the way we experience time and think about it. There are, however, some theories that offer a different account of time, claiming that the feeling of its flow is nothing but our own subjective category that in no way corresponds to the real nature of time. Time neither flows nor passes, it just is, equally real in all of its wholeness at once. These theories, properly called eternalist theories, deny the special status that has traditionaly been attributed to the present as the only real slice of time and they instead claim that past and future are just as real. In this paper I confront these two stands and sum up the main footholds and issues of eternalism and it rival, presentist theories.

Ključne riječi
presentism; eternalism; A-theory; B-theory; tensed semantics; tenseless semantics; reductionism

Hrčak ID: 37069



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