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Meaning, Classical Logic and Semantic Realism

Massimiliano Vignolo ; Department of Philosophy, University of Genoa, Genova, Italy

Sažetak

I argue that there are two ways of construing Wittgenstein’s slogan that meaning is use. One accepts the view that the notion of meaning must be explained in terms of truth-theoretic notions and is committed to the epistemic conception of truth. The other keeps the notion of meaning and the truth-theoretic notions apart and is not committed to the epistemic conception of truth. I argue that Dummett endorses the first way of construing Wittgenstein’s slogan. I address the issue by discussing two of Dummett’s arguments against the realist truth-theoretic conception of meaning: the manifestation argument and the argument for the unintelligibility of classical logic. I examine the dialectic of those arguments and show that they rest on the assumption that meaning needs to be explained in terms of truth-theoretic notions.

Ključne riječi

Dummett; meaning; truth; use; Wittgenstein

Hrčak ID:

54605

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/54605

Datum izdavanja:

29.6.2010.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

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