APA 6th Edition Crane, T. (2006). U čemu je problem opažanja?. Filozofska istraživanja, 26 (2), 257-282. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/5887
MLA 8th Edition Crane, Tim. "U čemu je problem opažanja?." Filozofska istraživanja, vol. 26, br. 2, 2006, str. 257-282. https://hrcak.srce.hr/5887. Citirano 07.04.2020.
Chicago 17th Edition Crane, Tim. "U čemu je problem opažanja?." Filozofska istraživanja 26, br. 2 (2006): 257-282. https://hrcak.srce.hr/5887
Harvard Crane, T. (2006). 'U čemu je problem opažanja?', Filozofska istraživanja, 26(2), str. 257-282. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/5887 (Datum pristupa: 07.04.2020.)
Vancouver Crane T. U čemu je problem opažanja?. Filozofska istraživanja [Internet]. 2006 [pristupljeno 07.04.2020.];26(2):257-282. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/5887
IEEE T. Crane, "U čemu je problem opažanja?", Filozofska istraživanja, vol.26, br. 2, str. 257-282, 2006. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/5887. [Citirano: 07.04.2020.]
Sažetak What is the distinctively philosophical problem of perception? Here it is argued that it is the conflict between the nature of perceptual experience as it intuitively seems to us, and certain possibilities which are implicit in the very idea of experience: possibilities of illusion and to the world' which involves direct awareness of existing objects and their properties. But if one can have an experience of the same kind without the object being there -- a hallucination of an object -- then it seems that perceptual experience cannot essentially be such a relation. This is the fundamentally philosophical problem of perception; the various philosophical theories of perception in the 20th and 21st centuries can be seen as responses to it.