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Intentionality and Experience

Dan Zahavi

Puni tekst: hrvatski, pdf (125 KB) str. 319-337 preuzimanja: 672* citiraj
APA 6th Edition
Zahavi, D. (2006). Intencionalnost i iskustvo. Filozofska istraživanja, 26 (2), 319-337. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/5893
MLA 8th Edition
Zahavi, Dan. "Intencionalnost i iskustvo." Filozofska istraživanja, vol. 26, br. 2, 2006, str. 319-337. https://hrcak.srce.hr/5893. Citirano 08.04.2020.
Chicago 17th Edition
Zahavi, Dan. "Intencionalnost i iskustvo." Filozofska istraživanja 26, br. 2 (2006): 319-337. https://hrcak.srce.hr/5893
Harvard
Zahavi, D. (2006). 'Intencionalnost i iskustvo', Filozofska istraživanja, 26(2), str. 319-337. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/5893 (Datum pristupa: 08.04.2020.)
Vancouver
Zahavi D. Intencionalnost i iskustvo. Filozofska istraživanja [Internet]. 2006 [pristupljeno 08.04.2020.];26(2):319-337. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/5893
IEEE
D. Zahavi, "Intencionalnost i iskustvo", Filozofska istraživanja, vol.26, br. 2, str. 319-337, 2006. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/5893. [Citirano: 08.04.2020.]

Sažetak
Since the publication of Chalmer’s influential work, The Conscious Mind (1996), it has been customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and the first-person perspective, the ‘easy problems of consciousness’ mainly concern the notion of intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking the experiential dimension into account? And vice versa, is it possible to understand the nature of subjectivity and experience if we ignore intentionality, or do we not run the risk of thereby reinstating a Cartesian subject-world dualism that ignores everything captured by the phrase “being-in-the-world”? In my article, I will inquire whether phenomenal consciousness and intentionality are two sides of the same coin that cannot be separated without committing a fallacy of division.

Ključne riječi
Intentionality; experience; phenomenal awareness; Cartesian dualism; fallacy of division

Hrčak ID: 5893

URI
https://hrcak.srce.hr/5893

[hrvatski]

Posjeta: 1.186 *