Izvorni znanstveni članak

Knowledge, true belief, and virtuous fallibilism

David Martens

Sažetak

I rebut a complex ad hominem argument against the thesis that true belief is sufficient for knowledge. According to the argument, the insufficiency of true belief for knowledge is guaranteed by our epistemic obligation not to think of ourselves as infallible. My rebuttal
seeks clarity about the precise content of that obligation and emphasizes the variety of ways in which that thesis can be affirmed. Though I do not offer any positive argument for the sufficiency of true belief for knowledge, I think the thesis is creditable for being consistent with truths about our epistemic obligations.

Ključne riječi

belief; knowledg; epistemic obligation; epistemic virtue; fallibilism

Hrčak ID:

63449

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/63449

Datum izdavanja:

1.12.2010.

Posjeta: 809 *