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Understanding how experience "seems"

Thomas Raileigh ; King's College London

Sažetak

I argue against one way of understanding the claim that how one’s visual experience “seems” provides support for the naïve-realist theory and weighs against sense-data theories (and other theories). If my argument is correct, and we abandon this way of understanding how experience “seems”, we would lose one reason for favouring naïve- realism at the start of the dialectic of the traditional problem of perception. En route, I distinguish different ways of understanding the (alleged) transparency of experience, consider how to make sense of rival theorists’ disagreement over the manifest nature of visual phenomenology and recount a story about Wittgenstein.

Ključne riječi

visual experience; phenomenology; Tim Crane; M. G. F. Martin; transparency; naïve realism; sense-data; intentionalism; Wittgenstein; introspection; consciousness; attention

Hrčak ID:

63463

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/63463

Datum izdavanja:

1.12.2009.

Posjeta: 823 *