APA 6th Edition Ottmann, H. (2010). Prijateljstvo građana. Politička misao, 47 (3), 80-90. Preuzeto s https://hrcak.srce.hr/64118
MLA 8th Edition Ottmann, Henning. "Prijateljstvo građana." Politička misao, vol. 47, br. 3, 2010, str. 80-90. https://hrcak.srce.hr/64118. Citirano 15.12.2019.
Chicago 17th Edition Ottmann, Henning. "Prijateljstvo građana." Politička misao 47, br. 3 (2010): 80-90. https://hrcak.srce.hr/64118
Harvard Ottmann, H. (2010). 'Prijateljstvo građana', Politička misao, 47(3), str. 80-90. Preuzeto s: https://hrcak.srce.hr/64118 (Datum pristupa: 15.12.2019.)
Vancouver Ottmann H. Prijateljstvo građana. Politička misao [Internet]. 2010 [pristupljeno 15.12.2019.];47(3):80-90. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/64118
IEEE H. Ottmann, "Prijateljstvo građana", Politička misao, vol.47, br. 3, str. 80-90, 2010. [Online]. Dostupno na: https://hrcak.srce.hr/64118. [Citirano: 15.12.2019.]
Sažetak The author advocates a modernization of the antique doctrine of friendship.
Friendship understood in the political sense is the friendship of citizens, as a
regulative idea of ideal political community. Such friendship is above justice,
it implies a permanent and stable mutual benevolence, living together, harmony,
mutuality and equality, involvement and compassion, mutual openness
in words and deeds, a culture of voluntary cooperation and a spirit of selfaware
and self-responsible citizenship. Nowadays, in the global village of the
media, we face a major question: should the friendship of world-citizens take
precedence over the friendship of citizens? The importance of universalism in
the modern world has undoubtedly increased. The right of man has become
universal, morality is reflexive and also universal. Still, differences remain between
close and remote obligations. Two perspectives are necessary to the individual’s
orientation in modernity: the moral perspective and the ethical perspective.
The actual ethical and universal moral obligations must be divided
into ranks. This can be done only by fulfilling the obligations of closeness and
ethics and taking into account the universal requirement. The author concludes
that the friendship of world-citizens in modern society can be expressed in a
model of graded obligation. In a free community, foreignness and friendship
correspond to one another. Foreignness is not destiny. The own and the foreign
do not constitute a contradictory opposition. The long stretch between foreignness
and friendship of citizens is conceivable only on the basis of the logic of
freedom, which does not perceive the freedom of the other as a limitation of
and boundary to its own freedom, but as a prerequisite of it.