

**Orhan Cengiz**

Çukurova University, Pozanti  
Vocational School  
Department of Accounting  
and Taxation  
01470 Pozanti/Adana, Turkey  
ocengiz@cu.edu.tr

**Müge Manga**

Erzincan Binali Yıldırım  
University  
Department of Economics  
24002 Erzincan, Turkey  
mboga@erzincan.edu.tr

**JEL: F21, P48**

**Original scientific article**

<https://doi.org/10.51680/ev.35.1.8>

Received: December 14, 2021

Revision received: March 27, 2022

Accepted for publishing: March 28, 2022

This work is licensed under a  
Creative Commons Attribution-  
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0  
International License



# IS THERE ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GEOPOLITICAL RISK AND CLIMATE CHANGE?

## ABSTRACT

**Purpose:** The aim of this study is to point out the impact of geopolitical risk on climate change. The CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita is used as a proxy for climate change.

**Methodology:** In this study, the data sample covers annual data from 1990 to 2015 for 12 selected Latin American and Asian countries. After standard preliminary tests (Cross-sectional dependence tests, CIPS unit root test, and slope homogeneity test), we employ the second-generation estimator – the AMG (Augmented Mean Group) method to explore the long-run relationship between geopolitical risk and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita.

**Results:** The AMG findings document that a 1% rise in geopolitical risk escalates CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita by 0.001%. In addition, economic growth and fossil energy consumption foster CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita, whereas renewable energy contributes to decreasing CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita.

**Conclusion:** In recent years, scholars have attempted to explore the impact of geopolitical risk on environmental degradation. According to our results, in Latin American and Asian countries, decreasing geopolitical risk and conflict can impede environmental degradation. In the long run, a robust clean energy policy should be considered in case of geopolitical conflict by the government. Besides, the government should focus on renewable energy policy and substitute non-renewable energy resources with more technology-intensive resources.

**Keywords:** Geopolitical risk, climate change, environmental degradation, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions

## 1. Introduction

Climate change is one of the most critical global issues of today. The increase in energy use with the development of economic and commercial activities is the leading cause of climate change. Global energy demand is increasing due to economic growth and population growth. If alternative renewable energy sources do not substitute primary

energy demand, it will contribute to global climate change. In addition, the gradual increase in energy consumption complicates the fight against climate change (Our World in Data, 2021a). According to the IEA (2019) report, global energy demand increased by 2.3% in 2018. This increase represents the highest level since 2010. While the share of fossil fuels was 80% as of 2000, if this trend continues, the share of fossil fuels is expected to decrease to

74% with little change in 2030 within the framework of sustainable development goals.

CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, which have a significant share in greenhouse gas emissions, are among the most important causes of global climate change. Approximately 76% of the total greenhouse gas emissions belong to CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, 2021). Greenhouse gas emissions are also closely related to global warming. The global temperature increased by an average of 1.1°C in 2020 compared to 1850 (Our World in Data, 2021b).

IPCC (2018) proves the noticeable assessment for the future in its well-known report.

*"Human activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above pre-industrial levels, with a likely range of 0.8°C to 1.2°C. Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate. (high confidence)."*

In this context, substantial literature exists about the driver of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, one of the virtual drives of climate change. Moreover, the related literature investigates different factors as determinants of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, for example, economic growth, energy consumption, foreign direct investment, foreign trade, and renewable energy. In addition to the factors mentioned above, some studies (Adams et al., 2020; Akadiri et al., 2020; Hashmi et al., 2021; Zhao et al., 2021; Anser et al., 2021a, 2021b) that examine the impacts of geopolitical conflicts on climate change have recently come to the fore. Namely, geopolitical risk (GPR) is another dimension of climate change.

Geopolitical risk is increasing day by day. Developments such as conflicts among countries, terrorist attacks, and bomb attacks have an economic, political, social, and environmental impact (Caldara & Iacoviello, 2018; Anser et al., 2021a; Hashmi et al., 2021). Theoretical discussions explain the impact of geopolitical risk on the environment with two opposite approaches. From an optimistic perspective, GPR causes a decrease in economic activity and energy consumption. Thus it negatively affects environmental degradation. In contrast, according to the pessimistic view, GPR diminishes the research and development (R&D) process, discourages innovation policy, and hinders renewable energy investment. So it promotes to raise environmental degradation (Anser et al., 2021b).

In sum, the nexus between geopolitical risk and environmental degradation is not clear. Based on theoretical debates, there is a need for more empirical findings to clarify the relationship between geopolitical risk and environmental degradation. Hence, our study intends to explore the linkage between geopolitical risk and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in selected Latin American and Asian countries: Mexico, Korea, India, Brazil, China, Indonesia, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines for the period 1990-2015.

We have selected the Latin American and Asian countries in our analysis for the following reasons: (i) Latin American and Asian countries consume approximately 41.8% of global primary energy; ii) They emit about 47% of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions; and iii) These countries have higher geopolitical risks, and there are many geopolitical tensions and conflicts in their region.

Our paper contributes to the existing literature in three ways. (i) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first analysis to investigate the relationship between geopolitical risk and climate change for 12 Latin American and Asian countries. (ii) Political instability, terrorism, and conflicts are mainly considered risk indicators in the extant literature (Lu et al., 2020). However, we use the geopolitical risk (GPR) index as an indicator of geopolitical risks that consists of comprehensive combinations. (iii) We employ second-generation panel estimators considering cross-sectional dependency and slope homogeneity to explore the long-run relationship among variables.

The rest of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review; Section 3 provides the data, model, and methodology; findings are presented in Section 4, and discussion and policy recommendations based on results are put forward in Section 5.

## 2. Relevant literature

We categorized the empirical literature into three groups. The first group of studies examines the main driving factor of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in selected countries. The second group of studies examines the relationship between geopolitical risk and economic performance. The last group investigates the dynamic linkage between geopolitical risk and environmental degradation. Table 1 offers the literature review of the issue.

Table 1 Summary of relevant literature

Study	Sample/ Period	Variables	Method	Finding(s)
<b>Determinants of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in selected countries</b>				
Lee & Yoo (2016)	Mexico/ 1971 - 2007	Energy consumption (EC), CO <sub>2</sub> emissions (CO <sub>2</sub> ), real GDP (GDP)	Unit root, co-integration, and the error-correction model (ECM)	A one-way causality real GDP → EC, CO <sub>2</sub> → real GDP; two-way causality EC ↔ CO <sub>2</sub>
Sasana & Putri (2018)	1990-2014/ Indonesia	CO <sub>2</sub> emissions (CO <sub>2</sub> ), population growth (POP), fossil energy (FOS), renewable energy (REN)	Ordinary Least Square (OLS)	FOS and POP positively affect CO <sub>2</sub> ; REN negatively affects CO <sub>2</sub>
Jardón et al. (2017)	1971-2011/20 Latin American and Caribbean countries	CO <sub>2</sub> emissions per-capita (CO <sub>2</sub> ), real GDP per capita (GDP)	Fully Modified Ordinary Least Squares (FMOLS) and Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS)	EKC hypothesis is valid
Hanif et al. (2019)	1990-2013/ Emerging Asian economies	CO <sub>2</sub> emissions per-capita (CO <sub>2</sub> ), real GDP per capita (GDP), fossil fuels consumption (FFC), foreign direct investment (FDI), population growth (POP)	Panel Autoregressive Distributed Lags (ARDL)	GDP, FFC, and FDI have a positive impact on CO <sub>2</sub>
Eriandani et al. (2020)	1980-2018/ASEAN countries	CO <sub>2</sub> per capita (CO <sub>2</sub> ), foreign direct investment (FDI), GDP per capita (GDP), manufacturing value-added (MAN)	Granger causality	A one-way causality FDI → CO <sub>2</sub>
<b>Relationship between geopolitical risk and economic indicator</b>				
Soltani et al. (2021)	1995-2020/15 MENA countries	GDP per capita (GDP), foreign direct investment (FDI), financial development (FD), inflation (INF), trade openness (OPNS) geopolitical risk index (GPR)	Panel Vector Auto-Regression (PVAR)	GPR negatively affects GDP, whereas FD affects GDP in some countries
Soybilgen et al. (2019)	1986-2016/18 emerging nations	Real GDP growth rate (GDP), geopolitical risk index (GPR), human capital (HC), investment expenditure (INV), government expenditure (GOV), trade openness (TRADE)	Fixed effect	GDP harms real GDP
Lee et al. (2021)	2005M1-2017M12/ Selected 16 countries	Tourism demand (Q), per capita income (Y), relative prices (P), Inbound tourists (IT), Exchange rate (EX), Geopolitical risk (GPR)	AMG and Common Correlated Effects Mean Group (CCEMG)	GDP impedes Q
Le & Tran (2021)	1995-2018/9 Asian countries	Geopolitical risk index (GPR), capital expenditures (CAPX/ASSET), rule of law, investment freedom, GDP growth, inflation	Fixed effect, Two-Stage Least-Squares (2SLS), Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)	GPR strongly affects institutional investment in China and Russia, while small in India and Turkey

Study	Sample/Period	Variables	Method	Finding(s)
Hailemariam & Ivanovski (2021)	January 1999-August 2020/U.S.	Geopolitical risk index (GPR), world industrial production (WIP), price level (P), net expenditure for tourism exports and imports (TNX)	Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR)	GPR negative affects TNX
Alsagr & Almazor (2020)	1998-2017/ Emerging nations	Return on assets, Geopolitical risk index (GPR), oil rents, inflation, GDP, exchange rate, Non-performing loan, Bank deposits	Fixed effect	GPR plunges banking sector performance
Bilgin et al. (2020)	1985-2015/18 countries	Government investments (GI), geopolitical risk (GPR), per capita GDP (GDP), population (POP), trade openness (TO), age dependency (AD), urban population (UP), capital formation (CF), FDI, total debt (TD), budget deficit (BD)	Fixed-effects, Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDVC)	GPR incentives GI
Olanipekun & Alola (2020)	1975-2018/ Persian Gulf	Oil production (PROD), geopolitical risk index (GPR), natural resources rents (RENT), average damage cost (ACOD), crude oil price (PRICE)	Non-Linear Autoregressive Distributed Lag (NARDL)	Positive shocks in GPR and ACOD negatively affect PROD whereas negative shock in PRICE exerts PROD negatively
Akadiri et al. (2020)	1985Q1-2017Q4/Turkey	Geopolitical risk index (GPR), real GDP (GDP), number of inbound tourists (TOUR)	Toda & Yamamoto causality test (1995)	GPR negatively affects real GDP and TOUR; also a one-way causality GPR → GDP, GPR → TOUR
<b>Geopolitical risk and environmental degradation</b>				
Anser et al. (2021a)	1985-2015/ BRIC	Geopolitical risk index (GPR), carbon dioxide emissions (CO <sub>2</sub> ), GDP per capita (GDP), non-renewable energy (ENE), renewable energy (REN), total population (POP)	AMG	GPR, GDP, POP, and ENE increase CO <sub>2</sub> while REN impedes CO <sub>2</sub>
Anser et al. (2021b)	1995-2015/ Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Colombia, and China	Ecological footprint (EF), GDP per capita (GDP), non-renewable energy (EN), renewable energy (REN), economic policy uncertainty index (EPU), geopolitical risk index (GPR)	Co-integration, FMOLS, DOLS, AMG	EPU and EN foster EF while GPR and GDP decrease EF
Zhao et al. (2021)	1985-2019/ BRIC	Carbon dioxide emissions (CO <sub>2</sub> ), energy consumption (EC), geopolitical risk index (GPR), government stability (GS), GDP per capita (GDP)	NARDL	An increase in GPR plunges CO <sub>2</sub> in Russia and South Africa; a decrease in GPR decreases CO <sub>2</sub> in India, China, and South Africa
Hashmi et al. (2021)	1970-2015/ Global Level	World carbon dioxide emissions (CO <sub>2</sub> ), geopolitical risk index (GPR), world GDP (GGDP), world energy consumption (GEN)	Bootstrap ARDL	EKC is valid; GPR negatively affects CO <sub>2</sub> in the short run, positively affects in the long run

Study	Sample/Period	Variables	Method	Finding(s)
Sweidan (2021)	1973Q1-2020Q1/U.S.	Geopolitical risk index (GPR), world oil prices (OP), real gross domestic product (Y), renewable energy (RER), real economic growth (GW) and long-run economic growth (LGW)	ARDL	GPR positively affects RER
Adams et al. (2020)	1996-2017/ Resource-rich countries	CO <sub>2</sub> emissions (CO <sub>2</sub> ), real GDP per capita (RGDP), energy use (ENC), economic policy uncertainty (EPU), geopolitical risk index (GPR)	PMG-ARDL, Kao cointegration, Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) causality test	ENC and RGDP increase CO <sub>2</sub> ; a bidirectional causality CO <sub>2</sub> ↔ ENC, RGDP ↔ EPU, RGDP ↔ CO <sub>2</sub> ; a unidirectional causality CO <sub>2</sub> → GPR
Alsagr & Hemmen (2021)	1996-2015/ Developing countries	Renewable energy (REC), private credit (PCD), bank credit (BCB), domestic credit (DCP), stock market turnover ratio (TOR), geopolitical risk index consumer price index (CPI), GDP per capita (GDPPC)	Two-step system GMM	Financial development and GPR cause an increase in REC
Rasoulin-ezhad et al. (2020)	1993-2018/ Russia	Energy transition (ET), inflation (INF), CO <sub>2</sub> emissions (CO <sub>2</sub> ), exchange rate (EXC), economic growth (GRO), population (POP), financial openness (FIN), geopolitical risk (GEO)	ARDL Bounds Testing	GEO positively affects ET

Source: Authors

After examining the related literature, it is seen that the empirical literature about the relationship between geopolitical risk and climate change is quite scarce. This refers especially to the effect of geopolitical risk on environmental degradation for Latin American and Asian countries, many of which have substantial geopolitical disputes and conflicts on a regional and global scale, for which previous research does not offer extensive empirical evidence.

### 3. Data and method

#### 3.1 Data

Our paper aims to investigate the impact of geopolitical risk on climate change by using the annual panel data of 12 Latin American and Asian countries (Mexico, Korea, India, Brazil, China,

Indonesia, Argentina, Colombia, Venezuela, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines) spanning the period 1990-2015. Data on the GPR index, developed by Caldara and Iacoviello (2018), are extracted from <http://policyuncertainty.com> and then converted into annual data. The GPR index is calculated via the frequency of newspaper articles involving notions related to geopolitical tension and conflict.

The dependent variable is CO<sub>2</sub> emissions as a proxy for climate change, whereas the control variables are GDP per capita (GDP), total population (POP), fossil energy consumption (FEUSE), and renewable energy consumption (REN), respectively. Annual data for control variables are gathered from World Bank. Table 2 provides the description, scope, and sources of variables.

**Table 2 Summary of variables**

Variable name	Abbreviation	Scale	Source
Carbon dioxide emissions	CO <sub>2</sub>	Metric ton per capita	World Bank
GDP per capita	GDP	GDP per capita (constant 2010 \$ US)	World Bank
Population	POP	Total population	World Bank
Fossil energy consumption	FEUSE	Percent of total final energy	World Bank
Renewable energy consumption	REN	Percent of total final energy	World Bank
Geopolitical risk index	GPR	Tally of newspaper articles containing geopolitics related terms	<a href="http://policyuncertainty.com">http://policyuncertainty.com</a>

Source: Authors

**3.2 Method**

This paper explores the long-term relationship between geopolitical risk and climate change. The impacts of the population (P), welfare (A), and technology (T) on environmental degradation were firstly discussed within the framework of the IPAT (Environmental Impact by Population, Affluence, and Technology) model developed by Ehrlich and Holdren (1971). The classical form of the IPAT model is given as follows:

$$I = P \cdot A \cdot T \quad (I = PAT) \tag{1}$$

In Eq. (1), I denotes influence (environmental degradation), P is population, A represents affluence or economic development, and T is technology. However, this model cannot fully reveal the effects of external variables that impact the environment individually, handles anthropogenic effects in a limited way, and is based on a simple equation that equally determines the impact of all variables on the environment (Wang et al., 2016, p. 1184). To overcome the limitations of the IPAT model, the STIRPAT (Stochastic Impacts by Regression on Population, Affluence and Technology) model was developed by Dietz and Rosa (1997). The general form of the STIRPAT model is as follows:

$$I_i = aP_i^b A_i^c T_i^d e_i \tag{2}$$

Eq. (2) keeps the general properties of the IPAT model; I, A, and P denote (environmental degradation), affluence or economic development, and population, respectively, as shown in Eq. (1). But, the “i” subscript is added to the STIRPAT model to emphasize that these quantities vary according to the observation units. In Eq. (2), The terms b, c, and

d, which express the coefficients of the explanatory variables, are estimated by applying standard statistical techniques. Namely, a denotes the constant term, while b, c, and d are the elasticities that determine the net impact of population welfare and technological changes on the environmental effects, respectively. In the STIRPAT model, the term T (technology) represents technological development and includes all other factors that reveal the impact of social organizations, institutions, culture, and individuals on the environment (Dietz & Rosa, 1997, p. 175). Anser (2019), Destek (2018), and Shahbaz et al. (2016) show in their study that the advantage of the STIRPAT model allows to include related variables in terms of analysis. Thus, we can add the geopolitical risk index into the model based on Anser et al.’s (2021a) study.

The new extended form of STIRPAT is as follows:

$$I_{it} = aP_{it}^b A_{it}^c T_{it}^d G_{it}^f e_{it} \tag{3}$$

In Eq. (3), G denotes the geopolitical risk index (GPR). All variables are converted to a logarithmic form to escape the heterogeneity problem. So the new form of the model can be expressed as follows:

$$\log I_{it} = a + b(\log P_{it}) + c(\log A_{it}) + d(\log T_{it}) + f(\log G_{it}) + e_{it} \tag{4}$$

Where a is the intercept; b, c, d, and f are coefficients, with i and t representing cross-section and time, respectively, and  $e_{it}$  is the error term. The final empirical model used yields:

$$\log(CO_{2,it}) = a + \beta_1 \log(GDP_{it}) + \beta_2 \log(POP_{it}) + \beta_3 \log(FEUSE_{it}) + \beta_4 \log(REN_{it}) + \beta_5 \log(GPR_{it}) + e_{it} \tag{5}$$

In Eq. (5),  $CO_{2,it}$  is carbon dioxide emissions per capita,  $GDP_{it}$  is GDP per capita, used as a proxy for A (affluence).  $FEUSE_{it}$  represents fossil energy consumption for non-renewable energy consumption and  $REN_{it}$  denotes renewable energy consumption. Both  $FEUSE_{it}$  and  $REN_{it}$  are utilized as proxies for T (technology).  $POP_{it}$  represents total population,  $GPR_{it}$  is the geopolitical risk index, and  $\alpha_i$  stands for country fixed effects.

Several empirical pieces of evidence (Chen & Huang, 2013; Mesagan, 2015; Uddin & Wadud, 2014; Zhang et al., 2021) show that economic growth positively impacts  $CO_2$  emissions. Non-renewable energy is also one of the critical determinants of  $CO_2$  emissions, and it is positively associated with  $CO_2$  emissions; in contrast, renewable energy has a negative impact on  $CO_2$  emissions (Chen & Geng, 2017; Sharif et al., 2019; Fatima et al., 2021). Furthermore, the relationship between population and  $CO_2$  emissions is unclear (Zhou & Liu, 2016; Zhang et al., 2018; Khan & Yahong, 2021). Recently, a few studies have considered geopolitical risk as a new determinant of environmental degradation (Anser et al., 2021a; Anser et al., 2021b; Zhao et al., 2021).

### 3.2.1 Cross-sectional dependence

In empirical analyses, cross-sectional dependence (CD) is one of the critical points to obtain robust results. Ignoring CD may lead to inconsistent results. In this framework, before testing stationarity properties of variables, we employ Breusch-Pagan LM,  $LM_{adj}$ , and Pesaran CD tests for testing cross-sectional dependence among variables. Breusch-Pagan LM test provides consistent and reliable results in case of relatively small cross-section (N) and sufficiently large time dimension (T), and can be reported as follows (Huang, 2016, p. 253):

$$LM = T \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^N \hat{\rho}_{ij}^2 \tag{6}$$

In Eq. (6),  $i$  indices denote cross-section and T is time.

The Pesaran CD test can be expressed as follows:

$$CD = \sqrt{\left(\frac{2T}{N(N-1)}\right)} \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^N (\hat{\rho}_{ij} - 1) \sim N(0,1) \tag{7}$$

In the Pesaran (2004) CD test, under the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence with

$T \rightarrow \infty$  and  $N \rightarrow \infty$ , this test statistic is asymptotically distributed as standard normal. However, in some cases, due to the decreasing power of the Pesaran (2004) CD test (Chang et al., 2015a, p. 291) the revised version of the LM test, the bias-adjusted LM, proposed by Pesaran et al. (2008), can be used where N is large, and T is small. The bias-adjusted LM statistic is defined as follows (Pesaran et al., 2008, p. 108; Chang et al., 2015b, p. 1407):

$$LM_{adj} = \sqrt{\left(\frac{2T}{N(N-1)}\right)} \sum_{i=1}^{N-1} \sum_{j=i+1}^N \frac{(T-k)\hat{\rho}_{ij}^2 - \mu_{Tij}}{\sqrt{v_{Tij}^2}} \sim N(0,1) \tag{8}$$

In Eq. (8),  $\mu_{Tij}$  and  $v_{Tij}^2$  denote the mean and variance of  $(T-k)\hat{\rho}_{ij}^2$ , respectively.

### 3.2.2 Slope homogeneity

Testing slope homogeneity is another critical preliminary stage in panel data econometrics. This study employs the Delta ( $\hat{\Delta}$ ) test proposed by Pesaran & Yamagata (2008). Under the null hypothesis of slope parameters are homogenous, the slope homogeneity test of Pesaran & Yamagata (2008) can be written as follows:

$$\tilde{S} = \sum_{i=1}^N (\hat{\beta}_i - \tilde{\beta}_{WFE})' \frac{x_i' M_{\tau} x_i}{\hat{\sigma}_i^2} (\hat{\beta}_i - \tilde{\beta}_{WFE}) \tag{9}$$

In Eq. (9),  $\hat{\beta}_i$  is the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator whereas  $\tilde{\beta}_{WFE}$  is the weighted fixed effect pooled estimator,  $\hat{\sigma}_i^2$  is the estimator of  $\sigma_i^2$ , and  $M_{\tau}$  is a matrix of T (Pesaran & Yamagata, 2008, p. 54).

### 3.2.3 Panel unit root

Various panel unit root tests exist that determine the stationary properties of variables. However, the first-generation panel unit root tests do not allow cross-sectional dependence. So in the presence of cross-sectional dependence, the first-generation panel unit root tests do not provide reliable results (Anser et al., 2021a). In this study, we perform the CIPS unit root test, which is one of the second-generation panel unit root tests that consider the presence of cross-sectional dependency heterogeneity (Rath & Akram, 2021).

The CIPS test is a derivative of the CADF (Cross-Sectional Augmented Dickey-Fuller) test developed by Pesaran (2007). The CADF regression is (Pesaran, 2007, p. 269):

$$\Delta Y_{it} = \alpha_i + b_i y_{i,t-1} + c_i \bar{y}_{t-1} + d_i \Delta \bar{y}_t + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (10)$$

Where  $\alpha_i$  is deterministic trend,  $\bar{Y}_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N Y_{it}$  and  $\Delta \bar{Y}_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \Delta Y_{it}$  (Wang et al., 2020).

After running the CADF statistics, the CIPS statistic, which is the mean of the CADF statistics, is calculated as follows:

$$CIPS = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N \tilde{\tau}_i \quad (11)$$

Where  $\tilde{\tau}_i$  represents the OLS t ratio of  $b_i$ . The critical values are obtained from Pesaran's (2007) study for testing unit root in all variables (Rodríguez & Valdés, 2019).

### 3.2.4 Augmented Mean Group (AMG) estimator

The last step of our empirical analysis is to estimate the regression equation (5). The current study estimates the long-run relationship between geopolitical risk and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions using the AMG estimator proposed by Eberhardt and Bond (2009) and Bond and Eberhardt (2013). The AMG estimator is robust across heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence. Furthermore, the AMG estimator al-

lows estimating of the model with non-stationary variables. In other words, the AMG method does not require the stationarity condition of the series (Destek, 2017), and it contains a two-step stage (Eberhardt & Bond, 2009).

The first stage of the AMG method can be written as follows

$$\Delta y_{it} = b' \Delta x_{it} + \sum_{t=2}^T c_t \Delta D_t + e_{it} \Rightarrow \hat{c}_t \equiv \hat{\mu}_t^\bullet \quad (12)$$

Then, the second stage of the AMG method yields:

$$y_{it} = a_i + b_i' x_{it} + c_i t + d_i \hat{\mu}_t^\bullet + e_{it} \Rightarrow \hat{b}_{AMG} = N^{-1} \sum_i \hat{b}_i \quad (13)$$

Eq. (12) refers to the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, where  $\Delta D_t$  illustrates T-1 period dummies in first differences,  $\hat{\mu}_t^\bullet$  labels year dummy coefficients. In Eq. (13)  $\hat{\mu}_t^\bullet$  represents the N group-specific regression whereas  $\hat{b}_i$  shows the mean of the individual coefficient estimates, following the Pesaran and Smith (1995) mean-group approach (Bond & Eberhardt, 2013).

## 4. Empirical results

In the first stage of the empirical analysis, we investigate the cross-sectional dependence. The results are provided in Table 3.

**Table 3 Cross-sectional dependence tests results**

	LnCO <sub>2</sub>	LnGDP	LnFUSE	lnREN	LnPOP	LnGPR
LM	728.8 [0.000]	285.7 [0.000]	311.8 [0.000]	279.7 [0.000]	270.8 [0.000]	696.9 [0.000]
CD <sub>LM</sub>	22.82 [0.000]	5.285 [0.000]	8.963 [0.000]	8.393 [0.000]	4.296 [0.000]	22.27 [0.000]
CD	28.499 [0.000]	40.046 [0.000]	11.184 [0.000]	9.943 [0.000]	41.301 [0.000]	14.71 [0.000]
La <sub>mada</sub>	163.2 [0.000]	50.19 [0.000]	59.47 [0.000]	51.8 [0.000]	48.31 [0.000]	155.3 [0.000]
		<b>Homogeneity Test</b>	<b>Test Statistics</b>	<b>Probability</b>		
		Δ	14.458	0.000		
		Δ <sub>adj</sub>	17.030	0.000		

Source: Authors



The results show that the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence is rejected at 1%. These results show dependence between countries in economic, political, and social fields; in other words, a shock in one country can affect another country. Similarly, the slope homogeneity test results show that the null hypothesis of slope parameters

are homogeneous and is rejected at 1%. Given the presence of cross-sectional dependence and slope heterogeneity, the first-generation unit root tests results can be biased and unreliable. Thus we employ the CIPS unit root test that allows the investigation of the stationary properties of variables. The CIPS unit test results are reported in Table 4.

**Table 4** The results of the CIPS unit root test

Variables	I(0)	I(1)
LnCO <sub>2</sub>	-1.612	-4.409***
LnGDP	-1.862	-3.976***
LnFEUSE	-2.057	-4.841***
LnREN	-1.810	-4.229***
LnPOP	-1.718	-2.185**
LnGPR	-2.370***	-

Note: \*\*\* and \*\* denote significance at 1% and 5%, respectively. The critical value at 1% is (-2.34), 5% (-2.17) and 10% (-2.07), respectively.

Source: Authors

As can be seen from Table 4, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at I(0) only for the GPR index. However, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at I(1) for CO<sub>2</sub>, GDP, FEUSE, REN, and POP, respectively. Thus, it can be said that the variables are stationary at different levels.

This paper employs the AMG method to determine the long-term relationship between the variables since the series have cross-sectional dependence and stationarity at different levels (Destek, 2020). In this regard, Table 5 reports the AMG results.

**Table 5** AMG results

Dependent Variable	LnGDP	LnFEUSE	LnREN	LnPOP	LnGPR
LnCO <sub>2</sub>	0.556***	0.784**	-0.009***	-9.008	0.001**

Note: \*\*\* and \*\* imply significance at 1% and 5%, respectively.

Source: Authors

The AMG results show that GDP, FEUSE, and GPR positively impact CO<sub>2</sub> emissions while REN is negatively associated with CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The coefficient of geopolitical risk is positive and statistically significant, implying that an increase of 1% in geopolitical risk escalates the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per capita by 0.001%. This finding is in line with the studies of Anser et al. (2021a), Hashmi et al. (2021), and Bildirci & Gokmenoglu (2020).

## 5. Conclusion and policy recommendations

In the 21st century, geopolitical risks and debates are increasing worldwide. Although the geopolitical risk significantly affects economic growth, investments, and many macroeconomic indicators; its impact on climate change and environmental degradation is not clear enough. Based on this framework, this study aims to analyse the impact of geopolitical risk, economic growth, fossil energy use, renewable energy consumption, and total pop-

ulation on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in selected Latin American and Asian countries over the period from 1990 to 2015. The findings from the AMG method confirm that geopolitical risk fosters CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Furthermore, economic growth and fossil energy use lead to rising CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. As opposed to that, renewable energy consumption is negatively associated with CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

These countries are exposed to high geopolitical risks. The increase in geopolitical risks increases militarization activities, adversely affecting the environment (Bildirici, 2017). Because within militarization, the use of military equipment and routine military activities require a high amount of energy consumption (Solarin et al., 2018). Building large-scale military infrastructure in terms of national security concerns accelerates environmental deterioration (Clark & Jorgenson, 2012). The impact of economic growth on environment degradation is positive, as expected. In other words, as economic growth increases, environmental degradation increases as well. This outcome is consistent with many studies in the existing literature (Bouznit & Pablo-Romero, 2016; Alam, 2014; Hanif et al., 2019; Nosheen et al., 2021; Koengkan & Fuinhas, 2020). One of the most important reasons for this is that the economic structure heavily depends on the primary sector that requires more energy consumption in these countries. Since economic growth requires high levels of fossil energy, particularly in developing countries, it triggers environmental degradation and climate change (Ali et al., 2021; Li & Yang, 2016; Liu et al., 2020).

Also, renewable energy is negatively associated with climate change in these countries. However, a well-designed renewable energy system contributes to energy efficiency and decreases dependency on fossil energy, reducing the climate change process (Sahoo & Sahoo, 2020; Haldar & Sethi, 2021).

Based on the above findings, we put forward some policy recommendations. First, policy-makers should strive to decrease geopolitical risks and tensions between countries. In this regard, the agreements and treaties have critical roles among nations. Moreover, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) undertake to plunge into geopolitical risks in this process. Secondly, governments expand incentives for renewable energy and tighten the non-renewable energy policy. Latin American and Asian economies still depend on primary energy sources such as fossil energy. Therefore, energy transition should become one of the most preliminary agendas in these countries.

The main limitation of our paper is that we analyse the impact of geopolitical risk on climate change by controlling economic growth, population, fossil energy, and renewable energy consumption. However, various factors affect climate change via interaction with geopolitical risk. For instance, nowadays, institutional quality and globalization are closely related to geopolitical risks. Thus, future studies can focus on the impact of these factors on different countries.

## REFERENCES

1. Adams, S., Adedoyin, F., Olaniran, E. & Bekun, F. V. (2020). Energy consumption, economic policy uncertainty and carbon emissions; causality evidence from resource-rich economies. *Economic Analysis and Policy*, 68, 179-190. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eap.2020.09.012>
2. Akadiri, S. S., Eluwole, K. K., Akadiri, A. C. & Avci, T. (2020). Does causality between geopolitical risk, tourism and economic growth matter? Evidence from Turkey. *Journal of Hospitality and Tourism Management*, 43, 273-277. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhtm.2019.09.002>
3. Alam, J. (2014). On the relationship between economic growth and CO2 emissions: The Bangladesh experience. *IOSR Journal of Economics and Finance*, 5(6), 36-41. <https://doi.org/10.9790/5933-05613641>
4. Ali, M. U., Gong, Z., Ali, M. U., Wu, X. & Yao, C. (2021). Fossil energy consumption, economic development, inward FDI impact on CO2 emissions in Pakistan: testing EKC hypothesis through ARDL model. *International Journal of Finance & Economics*, 26(3), 3210-3221. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.1958>
5. Alsagr, N. & Almazor, S. F. V. H. (2020). Oil rent, geopolitical risk and banking sector performance. *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 10(5), 305-314. <https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.9668>
6. Alsagr, N. & Hemmen, S. V. (2021). The impact of financial development and geopolitical risk on renewable energy consumption: evidence from emerging markets. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 28(20), 25906-25919. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-12447-2>
7. Anser, M. K. (2019). Impact of energy consumption and human activities on carbon emissions in Pakistan: application of STIRPAT model. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 26(13), 13453-13463. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-019-04859-y>
8. Anser, M. K., Syed, Q. R. & Apergis, N. (2021a). Does geopolitical risk escalate CO2 emissions? Evidence from the BRICS countries. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 28, 48011-48021. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-14032-z>
9. Anser, M. K., Syed, Q. R., Lean, H. H., Alola, A. A. & Ahmad, M. (2021b). Do economic policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk lead to environmental degradation? Evidence from emerging economies. *Sustainability*, 13(11), 5866. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su13115866>
10. Bildirici, M. (2017). CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and militarization in G7 countries: Panel cointegration and trivariate causality approaches. *Environment and Development Economics*, 22(6), 771-791. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X1700016X>
11. Bildirici, M. & Gokmenoglu, S. M. (2020). The impact of terrorism and FDI on environmental pollution: evidence from Afghanistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Syria, Somalia, Thailand and Yemen. *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 81, 106340. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eiar.2019.106340>
12. Bilgin, M. H., Gozgor, G. & Karabulut, G. (2020). How do geopolitical risks affect government investment? An empirical investigation. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 31(5), 550-564. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2018.1513620>
13. Bond, S. & Eberhardt, M. (2013). *Accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in panel time series models*. <https://lezme.github.io/markuseberhardt/BEMC.pdf>
14. Bouznit, M. & Pablo-Romero, M. D. P. (2016). CO2 emission and economic growth in Algeria. *Energy Policy*, 96, 93-104. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.05.036>
15. Caldara, D. & Lacoviello, M. (2018). *Measuring Geopolitical Risk* (FRB International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1222). Washington, DC: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. <https://doi.org/10.17016/IFDP.2018.1222>
16. Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (2021). *Global Emissions*. <https://www.c2es.org/content/international-emissions/>
17. Chang, T., Chen, W. Y., Gupta, R. & Nguyen, D. K. (2015a). Are stock prices related to the political uncertainty index in OECD countries? Evidence from the bootstrap panel causality test. *Economic Systems*, 39(2), 288-300. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2014.10.005>

18. Chang, T., Gupta, R., Inglesi-Lotz, R., Simo-Kengne, B., Smithers, D. & Trembling, A. (2015b). Renewable energy and growth: Evidence from heterogeneous panel of G7 countries using Granger causality. *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, 52, 1405-1412. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.08.022>
19. Chen, J. H. & Huang, Y. F. (2013). The study of the relationship between carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) emission and economic growth. *Journal of International and Global Economic Studies*, 6(2), 45-61.
20. Chen, W. & Geng, W. (2017). Fossil energy saving and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduction performance, and dynamic change in performance considering renewable energy input. *Energy*, 120, 283-292. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2016.11.080>
21. Clark, B. & Jorgenson, A. K. (2012). The treadmill of destruction and the environmental impacts of militaries. *Sociology Compass*, 6(7), 557-569. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2012.00474.x>
22. Destek, M. A. (2017). Biomass energy consumption and economic growth: Evidence from top 10 biomass consumer countries. *Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy*, 12(10), 853-858. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15567249.2017.1314393>
23. Destek, M. A. (2018). Çevresel Kuznets Eğrisi hipotezinin Türkiye için incelenmesi: STIRPAT modelinden bulgular. *Cumhuriyet Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi*, 19(2), 268-283.
24. Destek, M. A. (2020). Investigation on the role of economic, social, and political globalization on environment: Evidence from CEECs. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 27(27), 33601-33614. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-019-04698-x>
25. Dietz, T. & Rosa, E. A. (1997). Effects of population and affluence on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 94(1), 175-179. <https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.94.1.175>
26. Economic Policy Uncertainty (n.d.). <http://policyuncertainty.com>
27. Eberhardt, M. & Bond, S. (2009). Cross-section dependence in nonstationary panel models: A novel estimator. *MPRA Paper 17180*, 1-28.
28. Ehrlich, P. R. & Holdren, J. P. (1971). Impact of population growth. *Science*, 171(3977), 1212-1217. <https://doi.org/10.1126/science.171.3977.1212>
29. Eriandani, R., Anam, S., Prastiwi, D. & Triani, N. N. A. (2020). The impact of foreign direct investment on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in ASEAN countries. *International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy*, 10(5), 584-592. <https://doi.org/10.32479/ijeep.10230>
30. Fatima, T., Shahzad, U. & Cui, L. (2021). Renewable and non-renewable energy consumption, trade and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in high emitter countries: Does the income level matter? *Journal of Environmental Planning and Management*, 64(7), 1227-1251. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09640568.2020.1816532>
31. Hailemariam, A. & Ivanovski, K. (2021). The impact of geopolitical risk on tourism. *Current Issues in Tourism*, 24(22), 3134-3140. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13683500.2021.1876644>
32. Haldar, A. & Sethi, N. (2021). Effect of institutional quality and renewable energy consumption on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions – an empirical investigation for developing countries. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 28, 15485-15503. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-020-11532-2>
33. Hanif, I., Raza, S. M. F., Gago-de-Santos, P. & Abbas, Q. (2019). Fossil fuels, foreign direct investment, and economic growth have triggered CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in emerging Asian economies: some empirical evidence. *Energy*, 171, 493-501. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2019.01.011>
34. Hashmi, S. M., Bhowmik, R., Inglesi-Lotz, R. & Syed, Q. R. (2021). Investigating the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis amidst geopolitical risk: Global evidence using bootstrap ARDL approach. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-17488-1>
35. IEA (International Energy Agency) (2019). *World Energy Outlook 2019*.
36. Huang, C. J. (2016). Is corruption bad for economic growth? Evidence from Asia-Pacific countries. *The North American Journal of Economics and Finance*, 35, 247-256. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2015.10.013>
37. IPCC (2018). Summary for Policymakers. In Masson-Delmotte, V. et al. (Eds.), *Global Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and*

related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.

38. Jardón, A., Kuik, O. & Tol, R. S. (2017). Economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions: An analysis of Latin America and the Caribbean. *Atmosfera*, 30(2), 87-100. <https://doi.org/10.20937/ATM.2017.30.02.02>
39. Khan, S. & Yahong, W. (2021). Symmetric and asymmetric impact of poverty, income inequality, and population on carbon emission in Pakistan: new evidence from ARDL and NARDL co-integration. *Frontiers in Environmental Science*, 9, 1-13. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fenvs.2021.666362>
40. Koengkan, M. & Fuinhas, J. A. (2020) Exploring the effect of the renewable energy transition on CO2 emissions of Latin American & Caribbean countries. *International Journal of Sustainable Energy*, 39(6), 515-538. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14786451.2020.1731511>
41. Le, A. T. & Tran, T. P. (2021). Does geopolitical risk matter for corporate investment? Evidence from emerging countries in Asia. *Journal of Multinational Financial Management*, 100703. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mulfin.2021.100703>
42. Lee, C. C., Olasehinde-Williams, G. & Akadiri, S. S. (2021). Geopolitical risk and tourism: Evidence from dynamic heterogeneous panel models. *International Journal of Tourism Research*, 23(1), 26-38. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jtr.2389>
43. Lee, S. J. & Yoo, S. H. (2016). Energy consumption, CO2 emission, and economic growth: Evidence from Mexico. *Energy Sources, Part B: Economics, Planning, and Policy*, 11(8), 711-717. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15567249.2012.726695>
44. Li, D. & Yang, D. (2016). Does non-fossil energy usage lower CO2 emissions? Empirical evidence from China. *Sustainability*, 8, 874. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su8090874>
45. Liu, J. L., Ma, C. Q., Ren, Y. S. & Zhao, X. W. (2020). Do real output and renewable energy consumption affect CO2 emissions? Evidence for selected BRICS countries. *Energies*, 13, 960. <https://doi.org/10.3390/en13040960>
46. Lu, Z., Gozgor, G., Huang, M. & Lau, C. K. M. (2020). The impact of geopolitical risks on financial development: Evidence from emerging markets. *Journal of Competitiveness*, 12(1), 93-107. <https://doi.org/10.7441/joc.2020.01.06>
47. Mesagan, E. P. (2015). Economic growth and carbon emission in Nigeria. *The IUP Journal of Applied Economics*, 14(4), 61-75.
48. Nosheen, M., Iqbal, J. & Khan, H. U. (2021). Analyzing the linkage among CO2 emissions, economic growth, tourism, and energy consumption in the Asian economies. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 28(13), 16707-16719. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-020-11759-z>
49. Olanipekun, I. O. & Alola, A. A. (2020). Crude oil production in the Persian Gulf amidst geopolitical risk, cost of damage and resources rents: is there asymmetric inference? *Resources Policy*, 69, 101873. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2020.101873>
50. Our World in Data (2021a). *Energy production and consumption*. <https://ourworldindata.org/energy-production-consumption>
51. Our World in Data (2021b). *CO<sub>2</sub> and greenhouse gas emissions*. <https://ourworldindata.org/co2-and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions>
52. Pesaran, M. H. (2004). *General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence in Panels* (IZA Discussion Paper No. 1240). Bonn: Institute of the Study of Labor. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.572504>
53. Pesaran, M. H. (2007). A simple panel unit root test in the presence of cross-section dependence. *Journal of Applied Econometrics*, 22(2), 265-312. <https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.951>
54. Pesaran, M. H. & Smith, R. (1995). Estimating long-run relationships from dynamic heterogeneous panels. *Journal of Econometrics*, 68(1), 79-113. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076\(94\)01644-F](https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(94)01644-F)
55. Pesaran, M. H. & Yamagata, T. (2008). Testing slope homogeneity in large panels. *Journal of Econometrics*, 142(1), 50-93. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.010>

56. Pesaran, M. H., Ullah, A. & Yamagata, T. (2008). A bias-adjusted LM test of error cross-section independence. *The Econometrics Journal*, 11(1), 105-127. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1368-423X.2007.00227.x>
57. Rasoulinezhad, E., Taghizadeh-Hesary, F., Sung, J. & Panthamit, N. (2020). Geopolitical risk and energy transition in Russia: Evidence from ARDL bounds testing method. *Sustainability*, 12(7), 2689. <https://doi.org/10.3390/su12072689>
58. Rath, B. N. & Akram, V. (2021). Does COVID-19 outbreak cause spot electricity price discovery in India? *Journal of Public Affairs*, 21, e2439. <https://doi.org/10.1002/pa.2439>
59. Rodríguez, A. F. & Valdés, M. N. (2019). Health care expenditures and GDP in Latin American and OECD countries: a comparison using a panel cointegration approach. *International Journal of Health Economics and Management*, 19, 115-153. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10754-018-9250-3>
60. Sahoo, M. & Sahoo, J. (2020). Effects of renewable and non-renewable energy consumption on CO2 emissions in India: empirical evidence from disaggregated data analysis. *Journal of Public Affairs*, e2307.
61. Sasana, H. & Putri, A. E. (2018). The increase of energy consumption and carbon dioxide (CO2) emission in Indonesia. *E3S Web of Conferences*, 31, 01008. <https://doi.org/10.1051/e3sconf/20183101008>
62. Shahbaz, M., Loganathan, N., Muzaffar, A. T., Ahmed, K. & Jabran, M. A. (2016). How urbanization affects CO2 emissions in Malaysia? The application of STIRPAT model. *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, 57, 83-93. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.12.096>
63. Sharif, A., Raza, S. A., Ozturk, I. & Afshan, S. (2019). The dynamic relationship of renewable and non-renewable energy consumption with carbon emission: A global study with the application of heterogeneous panel estimations. *Renewable Energy*, 133, 685-691. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.renene.2018.10.052>
64. Solarin, S. A., Al-Mulali, U. & Ozturk, I. (2018). Determinants of pollution and the role of the military sector: Evidence from a maximum likelihood approach with two structural breaks in the USA. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 25, 30949-30961. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-018-3060-5>
65. Soltani, H., Triki, M. B., Ghandri, M. & Abderzag, F. T. (2021). Does geopolitical risk and financial development matter for economic growth in MENA countries? *Journal of International Studies*, 14(1), 103-116. <https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2021/14-1/7>
66. Soybilgen, B., Kaya, H. & Dedeoglu, D. (2019). Evaluating the effect of geopolitical risks on the growth rates of emerging countries. *Economics Bulletin*, 39(1), 717-725.
67. Sweidan, O. D. (2021). The geopolitical risk effect on the US renewable energy deployment. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 293, 126189. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2021.126189>
68. Uddin, M. M. M. & Wadud, M. A. (2014). Carbon emission and economic growth of SAARC countries: a vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis. *Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research*, 2(2), 7-26.
69. Wang, Y., Han, R. & Kubota, J. (2016). Is there an environmental Kuznets curve for SO2 emissions? A semi-parametric panel data analysis for China. *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews*, 54, 1182-1188. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2015.10.143>
70. Wang, Z., Bui, Q. & Zhang, B. (2020). The relationship between biomass energy consumption and human development: Empirical evidence from BRICS countries. *Energy*, 194, 116906. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2020.116906>
71. World Bank. *World Development Indicators*. <https://data.worldbank.org/>
72. Zhang, G., Zhang, N. & Liao, W. (2018). How do population and land urbanization affect CO2 emissions under gravity center change? A spatial econometric analysis. *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 202, 510-523. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2018.08.146>
73. Zhang, J., Dai, Y., Su, C. W., Kirikkaleli, D. & Umar, M. (2021). Intertemporal change in the effect of economic growth on carbon emission in China. *Energy & Environment*, 32(7), 1207-1225. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0958305X211008618>
74. Zhao, W., Zhong, R., Sohail, S., Majeed, M. T. & Ullah, S. (2021). Geopolitical risks, energy consumption, and CO2 emissions in BRICS: an asymmetric analysis. *Environmental Science and Pollution Research*, 28, 39668-39679. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-13505-5>
75. Zhou, Y. & Liu, Y. (2016). Does population have a larger impact on carbon dioxide emissions than income? Evidence from a cross-regional panel analysis in China. *Applied Energy*, 180, 800-809. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2016.08.035>