

Josip Guć

Kant and Bioethics: From the Appreciation of Non-Human Life to the Issue of Health – Editorial

The appreciation of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) in bioethics is somewhat ambivalent. Suppose bioethics is restricted to (bio)medical ethics. In that case, Kant’s potential contribution to some of the central bioethical concepts (e.g., autonomy, where Kant’s philosophy is indispensable) is excluded in its initial stages, as seen in “American Principlism” (Beauchamp & Childress, *Principles of Biomedical Ethics*, 1979). The attempt to establish “European Principlism” (Rendtorff & Kemp, eds., *Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw*, 2000) took Kant into account, as did some other authors. The neglect of Kant in the (bio)medical context of bioethics is due more to superficiality and a lack of philosophical knowledge than to a conscious rejection of Kant’s philosophy.

However, this does not seem to be the case when it comes to the (broadly speaking) environmental aspects of bioethics. In this context, Kant is often proclaimed as one of the central philosophical culprits for the harmful anthropocentric treatment of non-human living beings. The potential of his contribution to animal ethics is sometimes limited to the benefits for non-human beings (the prohibition of cruelty), which are actually benefits for humans—bad treatment has a boomerang effect (the development of cruel dispositions). Non-human animals are still understood as mere things. Others, however, examine Kant’s philosophy more broadly and find deeper reasons for valuing non-human nature. Moreover, in the prehistory of bioethics, in the first mention of bioethics by Fritz Jahr (*Science of Life and Doctrine of Morals*, 1926), Kant’s Categorical Imperative gained importance in formulating the *Bioethical Imperative*. In this thematic section, Marko Kos writes about Kant’s role in Jahr’s ethics in his article “Jahrovi argumenti za zaštitu biljnog života i kantijanski utjecaj u njegovoj bioetici” (Jahr’s Arguments for the Protection of Plant Life and the Kantian

Influence in His Bioethics). Jan Defrančeski explores a similar theme in his article “Between Beautiful and Moral Action: Immanuel Kant and Arne Næss.”

What we have here are two comparative studies, but with two crucial bioethical figures—regardless of whether they labeled their positions as bioethical (like the “later discovered” father of bioethics, Fritz Jahr) or not (like Arne Næss, who should definitely serve as an indispensable reference for bioethicists). Most of the authors in this thematic section do not recount or directly constitute a Kantian bioethics. Such attempts already exist, either by considering bioethics in its full thematic scope (e.g., Eterović, *Kant and Bioethics*, 2017) or by considering a specific topic, such as animal ethics (e.g., Korsgaard, *Fellow Creatures*, 2018). In this thematic section, I also reflect on animal ethics in the paper “How Demands Shape Morality,” but not on one that emerges directly from Kant’s philosophy, rather one that is strongly influenced by it.

In this section, we try to show how Kant’s thought can inspire bioethical thought. In doing so, it is not necessary to follow the letter but the spirit of Kant’s philosophy, at least in the sense of following its critical determination. It does not matter that bioethical issues are marginal in Kant’s philosophy. What matters is that they (here I mean mainly the reflection on our relationship with other living beings) have also remained marginal for most contemporary philosophers. Reflecting on them is important not only because of the nature of the journal in which this thematic section is published, but also because of the critical mission that is essential to philosophy. The marginality of a given problem often leads to its obviousness, which is philosophy’s archenemy.

It is certainly a bioethical task to face the challenges of our time. In our time, one such challenge is the issue of health. After the pandemic that emerged a few years ago, we will certainly not think or talk about health in the same way as before. This does not mean, however, that we should not return to the old philosophers. One of them (try to guess who) is addressed by Vuk Trnavac in his article “Kant i *Zdravlje*: pute(vi) m(a) *metodoontološkog Zdravlja ((svih) drugih)*” (Kant and the *Health*: Through the path(s) of *methodoontological Health* of ((all) others)). In 300 years (of physical or spiritual life), Kant has always had something to say. It should not surprise us if he continues to speak with the same force in the challenges of the future, even as a 400-year-old man.

Josip Guć

Kant i bioetika: od uvažavanja ne-ljudskog života do problematike zdravlja – uvodnik

Immanuel Kant (1724. – 1804.) zauzima ambivalentno mjesto u bioetici. Uzme li se ona u obzir samo kao (bio)medicinska etika, bioetika u svojim začetnim stadijima, u „američkom principalizmu“ (Beauchamp i Childress, *Principi biomedicinske etike*, 1979.), posve isključuje potencijalni doprinos Kantove filozofije po pitanjima nekih središnjih pojmova, poput autonomije, za koje je Kant nezaobilazna referenca. No potonje su uvažili pokušaji zasnivanja „europskog principalizma“ (Rendtorff i Kemp, ur., *Osnovni etički principi u europskoj bioetici i biopravu*, 2000.), a onda i neki drugi autori. Zanemarivanju Kanta po ovom pitanju zapravo više kumuje površnost i izostanak filozofske potkovanosti negoli svjesno odbacivanje.

Čini se da to nije slučaj kada se u obzir uzme ona bioetička misao koja se okreće drugim živim bićima i prirodi uopće. Kant je tu nerijetko proglašavan za jednog od središnjih filozofskih krivaca za poguban antropocentrički tretman drugih živih bića. Potencijali njegova doprinosa etici životinja tako se ponekad ograničavaju na ustupke ne-ljudskim životinjama (zabranu okrutnosti) koji nisu ništa drugo do tretman obične stvari koji se kao bumerang vraća ljudima (razvijanje dispozicije za okrutnost), stoga i nepoželjan. Drugi pak sagledavaju Kantovu filozofiju u širem smislu, nalazeći dublje razloge za uvažavanje ne-ljudske prirode. Pored toga, Kantov se kategorički imperativ u prapočecima bioetike, pri njezinu prvom spominjanju (ali kasnijem otkrivanju) kod Fritza Jahra (*Znanost o životu i nauka o ćudoređu*, 1926.), uzima kao formalno važan za oblikovanje *bioetičkog imperativa*. O ulozi Kanta u Jahrovoj etici u ovom tematskom bloku piše Marko Kos u članku »Jahrovi argumenti za zaštitu biljnog života i kantijanski utjecaj u njegovoj bioetici«. Slično je u pogledu ekozofije Arnea

Næssa uradio Jan Defrančeski u svome članku naslovljenom »Between Beautiful and Moral Action: Immanuel Kant and Arne Næss« (Između lijepog i moralnog djelovanja: Immanuel Kant i Arne Næss).

Dakako, ovdje se prvenstveno radi o dvjema komparativnim studijama, no s dvije ključne bioetičke figure, zvali oni svoju misao bioetičkom (poput „kasnije otkrivenog“ oca bioetike Fritza Jahra) ili ne (poput Arnea Næssa, koji bi bioetičarima svakako trebao biti nezaobilazna referenca). Većina autora u ovom tematskom bloku ne prepričava niti izravno konstruira jednu Kantovu bioetiku. Takvi pokušaji već postoje, kako s obzirom na bioetiku u čitavom tematskom opsegu (npr. Eterović, *Kant i bioetika*, 2017.), tako i s obzirom na neke specifične teme, poput etike životinja (npr. Korsgaard, *Bližnja stvorenja*, 2018). Etikom životinja se u svome članku „How Demands Shape Morality“ (Kako zahtjevi oblikuju moralnost) i sam bavim, ne doduše takvom kakva bi proizlazila iz Kantove filozofije, nego onakvom kakva se njome u velikoj mjeri inspirira.

Upravo je to ono što se ovim tematskim blokom želi postići, naime, pokazati kako Kantova misao može inspirirati onu bioetičku. Pri tome ni u kom pogledu nije nužno slijediti slovo, koliko duh Kantove filozofije, pa makar se on ograničio samo na kritičko nastrojstvo koje ju krasí. Koliko su god bioetičke teme u Kantovoj filozofiji marginalne, možda baš zato što su nerijetko ostale marginalne i za današnje filozofe, usprkos drugačijim izazovima vremena (osobito tu mislim na ne-ljudska živa bića), okretanje njima važno je ne samo zbog prirode časopisa u kojem se ovaj tematski blok nalazi, nego i s obzirom na kritički zadatak čijim zanemarivanjem filozofija prestaje biti to što jest. Naime, marginalnost teme nerijetko rađa njezinom samorazumljivošću, prvim neprijateljem filozofije.

Zadatak je bioetike svakako suočavanje s izazovima vremena, a ovi su osobito aktualizirali problem zdravlja. Nakon pandemije koja je izbila prije nekoliko godina teško da će se o zdravlju misliti ili govoriti kao i ranije. No to ne znači da se ne treba obraćati starim filozofima. Na jednog takvog (pokušajte pogoditi kojega) u svom se članku „Kant i Zdravlje: pute(vi)m(a) *metodoontološkog Zdravlja ((svih) drugih)*“ osvrnuo Vuk Trnavac. U 300 godina života (što fizičkog, što duhovnog) Kant je neprestano imao što za reći. Ne treba, stoga, čuditi ako nam i u budućim izazovima nastavi istom snagom govoriti, pa i kao 400-godišnjak.