

The Inhumanity of War and the Fragility of Peace in Light of Political Theology and the Social Doctrine of the Church

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Summary

This article lays out views on war and peace in parallel from the perspectives of Carl Schmitt's political theology and the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. For Schmitt, war is crucial for the survival of the state and is its inalienable right. The Church points out the inhumanity of war and considers peace, alongside social justice, to be the responsibility of the international community. Both recognize the need for the moral and legal regulation of war to allow for the prospect of peace, though for different reasons.

Keywords: *political theology; war; peace; Carl Schmitt; Catholic Church; just war doctrine; Christian pacifism*

Introduction

The intent of this article is to explore the justifiability of war and probability of lasting peace through the ostensibly contrary claims by Carl Schmitt in his political theology and the social doctrine of the Catholic Church. Without excusing Schmitt's affiliation with the Nazi regime, Schmitt's scientific oeuvre should not be treated as the Nazis themselves treated "politically undesirable" literature. Rather, as Schmitt represents a kind of Jungian shadow of the political sciences, it is necessary to examine his insights on war as a threat to the very existence of the state and the consequent possibility of peace. Thus, the first part of this article lays out Schmitt's understanding of the polemical nature of man and his "bellicose" criterion of the political. Also discussed is the reason he attaches so much importance to the concepts of sovereignty, *katechon* and *nomos*.

Furthermore, this article provides an overview of a particular »theological hermeneutics of political ethics« found in the documents of the Catholic Church regarding the advancement of peace and justice in the world. In the encyclical

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Pacem in terris by Pope John XXIII, the *Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World Gaudium et Spes* by the Second Vatican Council, the encyclical *Populorum progressio* by Pope Paul VI, and the Apostolic Exhortation *Evangelii Gaudium* by Pope Francis there are repeated warnings against the use of force in international disputes, especially weapons of mass destruction, which puts the world at risk of “total war”. Relying on Johann Baptist Metz and Walter Benjamin for reference, the intention of the author is to show how the just war doctrine has been complemented by the “just peace ethic”.

These two perspectives, each in its own way, illuminate the reality of war as an act of aggression and violence mixed with the desire for peace and justice. On the one hand, there is an emphasis on the inescapable dynamic of political tension which risks war. On the other hand, one cannot overlook the Christian commitment to peace and justice despite the prevailing predisposition in favour of force as a means of conflict resolution. In addition, the aim is to show the response of both sides to the inhumanity of war and the elusiveness of peace.

1. *The political theology of sovereignty by Carl Schmitt*

Contrary to the liberal–democratic worldview which adopts a, by and large, anti–war position, Carl Schmitt considers conflict, or rather, everything political as crucially polemical. Man is by nature (morally) unrestrained and dangerous to others. So, every nation, pacifist or not, is confronted with the threat of aggression. The duty of the state is to manage the risk of armed conflict, to legally regulate conduct in war and enable peace. In this, the juridical concept of sovereignty is essential (Lapidot, 2020, 37–44).

While examining the aetiology of sovereignty in *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* (1922), Schmitt concluded all juridical concepts of substance were initially theological concepts, which were at one point appropriated, secularized and applied to government. Nevertheless, a structural analogy still remains between the original theological notions and the secularized juridical concepts (Schmitt, 1985, 36). This “sociology of juridical concepts” is the foundational thesis of his political theology: »The metaphysical image that a definite epoch forges of the world has the same structure as what the world immediately understands to be appropriate as a form of its political organization« (Schmitt, 1985, 46).

However, why sovereignty? As a secular analogy of God’s transcendence, sovereignty ensures the legitimacy of the state. As a Hobbesian “mortal god”, the state guarantees security, order, and peace in exchange for obedience. It also remains above its own laws, just as God is beyond the laws of nature. Thus, the authority and power of the state become independent of deontological appeals to orthodoxy, political ideology, or even a constitution. Hence, Schmitt’s political theology of sovereignty can be considered, as Matthias Lievens does, to be a “theology without God”, as it substitutes divine providence with human subjectivity (Lievens, 2009, 91–94).

However, one could say that Carl Schmitt also refutes the separation of religion and politics. In the Afterword to *Political Theology II* (1970), responding to Hans Blumenberg, Schmitt rejects the claim that today's society is emancipated from premodern traditions and guides itself in everything by reason and, in the case of politics, by positive law. The constitution assures the legality of the political process and the rule of law, but it does not provide legitimacy to the government. Thus, even liberal democracy acknowledges the effective and symbolic traditions of recognition and respect for the government. There is a need for some kind of civil religion in order to sacralize the power and authority of the state (Schmitt, 2008, 116–122). For Schmitt, the legitimacy of government does not have a purely rational basis. Something similar was also asserted by Walter Benjamin in his essay *Critique of Violence* (1921). According to Benjamin, the monopoly over force precedes the creation of legal and political order. Consequently, the use of force has a legislative and legitimising character for the state, instead of the reverse. Benjamin finds the archetype for such a use of force in myths, in the form of punishment by the gods for transgressing the natural order. The tragic doom of punished mortals establishes the new status quo. The state emulates such an intervention of divine power, which is understood as fate. So the use of force by the government cannot be rationally justified, only subsequently legalized (Benjamin, 1996, 236–242; 248–252).

Carl Schmitt defends his political theology in a similar way, referring to the term stasis (στάσις, ἡ). In his Third Theological Oration, Gregory of Nazianzus uses this term to describe the relationships between the divine hypostases within the Trinity. Stasis means stability, immutability, and serenity, but it also signifies movement, turmoil, and change. In antiquity, it was synonymous with civil war (Schmitt, 2008, 122–126). Schmitt interprets this ambiguity as a dialectical tension without resolution, subsumed in the Trinity as a potential for discord between the Father and the Son, which then manifests as an ever-present probability of conflict (Gazzolo, 2015, 32–35). The polemical nature of the political is thus enshrined and made an expression of the nature of existence. Furthermore, a reason has been given why everything political should be subordinated to the “mortal god” of the state: for protection from enemies. Contrary to his intention, Schmitt's “stasiology” revealed how an ontologization of political identities is actually a consequence of human nature wounded by sin and distancing from God (Lapidot, 2020, 41–44).

1.1. The “bellicose” concept of the political

The state is a specific political ordering of a nation, which transcends all divisions and disputes in society in order to resolve political issues without violence, i.e., without the risk of illegal usurpation of power or civil war. Schmitt considers the way the political is conceptually identified with the state to be the greatest success of modern political philosophy. However, in doing so there is a risk of equating the state with society. In the *Concept of the Political* (1932), Schmitt seeks to conceptually discern the political from state-controlled politics

by searching for the political antithesis which precedes the state (Lievens, 2009, 151–153).

If morality is determined through the opposition of good and evil, and aesthetics by discerning the beautiful from the ugly, such a dialectical distinction is applicable to the political as well. Schmitt finds such a core antithesis of the political in the distinction between friend and enemy. This criterion of the political »denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist theoretically and practically, without having simultaneously to draw upon all those moral, aesthetic, economic, or other distinctions« (Schmitt, 2007b, 26–27). Schmitt distils all political interactions to an encounter and facing off with the other, especially with the enemy. This serves to emphasize the polemical nature of the political: the always present risk of war, which eludes any regulation and therefore persists as a threat to the survival of the state (Schmitt, 2007a, 75–81).

Matthias Lievens asserts that the criterion of the political also hinders any dehumanizing of the enemy. To recognize someone as an enemy means to acknowledge their humanity and thereby equate them with oneself. Facing the enemy leads to questioning one's own morality. Conflict becomes a moral dilemma, with war crimes regarded as a kind of mortal sin, the cost of which is the loss of humanity. If the enemy is treated without mercy and respect, there is no chance for peace (Lievens, 2009, 123–136; 199–201, 209–211).

For this reason, Schmitt rejects the concept of just war, which implies that the enemy is a criminal who needs to be punished. Moreover, in the event of a moral condemnation of the enemy, as with Germany at the end of the First World War, another war is inevitable (Schmitt, 2007a, 81–88). For the same reason, Schmitt criticizes international organizations — the League of Nations and the United Nations — established to preserve world peace. Imposing peace in the name of humanity reintroduces the outdated concept of just war. Of course, wars are still fought, but ostensibly for humanitarian reasons and under the guise of peace-keeping military interventions, consequently blurring the distinction between war and peace. Likewise, the sovereign right of the state to declare war and make peace to ensure its survival has been infringed upon (Ojakangas, 2004, 127–134).

Schmitt criticizes the ideological appropriation of not only humanist values but even the very aspiration toward peace for geopolitical ends: »To confiscate the word humanity, to invoke and monopolize such a term probably has certain incalculable effects, such as denying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of humanity; and a war can thereby be driven to the most extreme inhumanity« (Schmitt, 2007b, 54–55).

Thus, Schmitt promotes the cultivation of war rather than the preservation of peace. A sovereign state cannot avoid discerning friend from enemy, nor renounce the responsibility to make crucial decisions on war and peace without jeopardizing its own existence. The dynamics of the political hamstring the goal of securing lasting peace (Schmitt, 2007a, 62–63; 81–88). In his *Theory of the Partisan* (1963), Schmitt points to the polemical nature of the political at work, even

in guerrilla resistance, that has no aspiration other than the defence of the homeland. Such a spontaneous and intensive “telluric” resistance to the enemy often escapes the grasp of abstract political ideologies (Schmitt, 2007a, 134–145; 172–177).

1.2. *Katechon and Nomos*

Schmitt’s position on war stems not only from his concept of the political, but also from the analysis of the centuries–old trend of depoliticization and neutralization of the political in modern European history after the trauma of the interconfessional wars of the 16th and 17th centuries (Schmitt, 2007b, 82–91). Echoing a similar claim by Karl Löwith, in *Political Theology II* Schmitt concludes that, even in a post–Christian modern era, mankind strives towards “salvation”, a final resolution of all historical tensions and turmoil. So, Schmitt subtly imbues his political theology with a certain millenarian view of history through the concept of *katechon* from the *Second Epistle to the Thessalonians* (cf. 2 Thessalonians 2:6–8). *Katechon* resists the modern secularized eschatology and utopian idealism, preserving the awareness of existential weight and moral significance inherent to freedom, which is especially evident in political decisions, for example, whether or not to declare war (Lievens, 2013, 415–418).

Katechon suppresses the influence of the Antichrist and so delays the return of Christ. This allows mankind to exercise free will without the risk of “eschatological paralysis” in anticipation of the Kingdom of God or extremism caused by eschatological presentism. Schmitt understands the Gospel as a universalist and pacifist message, which prophetically announces the end of all dialectical tension, including the necessity to discern friend from enemy, in the *eschaton*. Therefore, he rejects any pacifist effort for lasting peace here and now because Christ has not yet triumphed at the end of history. A non–political but meaningful existence in the present is utopian nonsense (Ojakangas, 2004, 139–148). So, in *The Concept of the Political* Schmitt restricts Christ’s commandment to love your enemy (cf. Mt 5:44; Lk 6:27) only to interpersonal relationships, excluding political activity (Schmitt, 2007a, 72–73).

Thus, political activity is not subject to religious dogma or eschatological expectations. Moreover, personal freedoms, including religious beliefs, are subordinated to the authority of the state, which does not interfere in the private lives of citizens until there is a political reason for it (Schmitt, 1996, 53–63). This shift in the relationship between religion and the state is expounded by Thomas Hobbes in his *Leviathan* (1651) and then sanctioned by the Peace of Westphalia (1648) as one of the core principles of modern *jus publicum Europaeum*. Thereafter national sovereignty constitutes a prerequisite for sustainable international politics. War is a matter of the survival of the nation, not religious orthodoxy or humanist values. *Katechon* no longer restrains the influence of the Antichrist in history, but in space, defending the institution of the state as an expression of human subjectivity (Schmitt, 2006, 58–66).

In *The Nomos of the Land* (1950), Schmitt further develops his “spatial ontology” with the juridical term *nomos* which juxtaposes localization (*Ortung*) and

ordering (*Ordnung*) of space and society. It denotes occupying and transforming space into the domain of the political. *Nomos* makes up the legal framework common to all states in a given territory, e.g., of Europe, which at the same time enables but also cultivates war. *Nomos* is the basis for Schmitt's critique of Western cosmopolitanism and the globalist world order. The disproportionate influence of world superpowers dissolves *nomos* to the detriment of smaller states. That is why the current *Pax Americana* has no legal basis in *nomos*, but relies on the dominance of the world's most prominent superpower. Still, imposed peace will inevitably cause resistance, and after discerning friend from enemy, will cause war. In this globalized world intersected by international defence alliances gathered around nuclear powers, another world war cannot be anything other than the last war (Minca, 2011, 166–172). With this in mind, what does the Catholic Church have to say on war and peace?

2. *The Catholic Church and its effort towards world peace*

While maintaining its traditional just war doctrine, the Catholic Church has been an outspoken advocate for world peace since World War II. In his encyclical *Pacem in terris* (1963), Pope John XXIII calls for an end to the nuclear arms race at the height of the Cold War (PT 109–113; 117–119). Even before Johann Baptist Metz came out with his new political theology, Pope John XXIII outlines a kind of »theological hermeneutics of political ethics« (Metz, 2004, 62–65, 129–133, 275–283), to warn what folly it is to accumulate weapons of mass destruction in the name of state security. Normalizing the use of force reduces every political dispute to a question of life or death in an atmosphere of distrust and anxiety (PT 114; 126–129). For this reason, the message of *Pacem in terris* after all this time remains significant.

The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World *Gaudium et Spes* (1965) also calls for peace, especially through international cooperation. A community of nations not guided solely by geopolitical interests or fretting under the threat of mass annihilation could genuinely strive for peace. The madness of »total war« lies in distorting the purpose of armed forces, which should be guided by the principle of proportional defence in order to de-escalate conflict and enable peace. Stressing the unity of all mankind, *Gaudium et Spes* condemns the inhumanity of war and advocates for »all men everywhere a world more genuinely human« (GS 77). Without mutual trust and solidarity, peace is reduced to a truce in anticipation of the next conflict (GS 77–91).

Not long after, Pope Paul VI in the encyclical *Populorum Progressio* (1967) touches on the importance of social justice, human rights, intangible cultural heritage and establishes the Pontifical Council Iustitia et Pax¹ (PP 5). Referencing his personal experiences, the tradition of natural law, and modern philosophical

1 In 2017, the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace merged with Dicastery for Promoting Integral Human Development.

and theological sources, Paul VI analyzed the causes of ideological disputes and social unrest, and thus war. A limited conception of the common good, reduced to concern over economic growth, forced many into moral and spiritual poverty. Alternatively, an integral human development could ensure a life of dignity for present and future generations. Only a persistent effort toward social justice, in accordance with God's will and Man's orientation towards God as the highest Good, can lead to peace (PP 16–21; 26–29; 44; 56–60; 62–63; 76–77). The legacy of *Populorum Progressio* can be found in subsequent papal documents on social issues such as *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* by Pope John Paul II, *Caritas in Veritate* by Pope Benedict XVI and *Evangelii Gaudium*, *Laudato Si'* and *Fratelli Tutti* by Pope Francis (Rapela Heidt, 2017, 1–8; 14–16).

The theological argument in favour of social engagement of the Church, according to the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church* (CSDC), is the undeniable reality of sin, more precisely, the social dimension of sin. Sin is not just a personal act of insubordination to the revealed will of God for mankind. It is also a structural violation of justice, alienation to the point of dehumanization of others and fostering discord until war breaks out. Devotion to peace and justice is thus integral to the Christian faith, because war is not just a clash of differing geopolitical interests but trampling of human dignity and the sanctity of life due to the sinful lust for power. Hence, peace cannot be reduced to the absence of conflict and war does not resolve political disputes and attain justice (CSDC 115–133, 141–143, 488–501).

2.1. *The just war doctrine and Christian pacifism*

The commitment of the Catholic Church to peace, caused by the unprecedented horrors of the Second World War and the apprehension as to weapons of mass destruction, remains an object of criticism in certain circles since the Church has not abandoned its traditional just war doctrine. To clarify, the Church does not advocate pacifism in the deontological sense, so there is no uncompromising opposition to war based on religious truths and universal moral principles. Since armed conflict cannot always be avoided, the Church, above all, seeks to reduce the effect of sin and the erosion of one's humanity in times of war.

The origin of the just war doctrine can be found in Augustine's attempt in *The City of God* to discern whether waging war is morally permissible to Christians. For Augustine, a just war is one that is imposed and unavoidable. The goal of a just war is peace, therefore unnecessary violence should be shunned and civilians spared. The just war doctrine was supplemented and systematized by Thomas Aquinas in the second section of the second part of *Summa Theologiae* in the context of the discourse on virtues (STh. II–II, q. 40). So, a just war presupposes a "just cause" and a "correct intention", for example, to rectify injustice and to preserve the common good. Furthermore, waging war is reserved exclusively for the state, and restraint in the use of force is expected (Mršić Felbar i Tolvajčić, 2017, 49–52).

Historically, the Church saw war as a necessary evil that ought to be limited, if possible. However, the intensifying geopolitical strife shortly after yet another worldwide conflict, prompted the Second Vatican Council to take a clearer stance on war. Yet, war was not unconditionally condemned but rather only the weapons of mass destruction (GS 79–80). Hence, the representatives of the Christian pacifism movement objected to this perceived tepidity of the Church. Christian pacifists also rejected the just war doctrine, since it was much too often taken advantage of to justify war. Instead, they argue in favour of the so-called “just peace ethics” to promote not only non-violent conflict resolution but also wider socio-political reforms with the aim of ending recurring cycles of ineffective truce and constant war. However, the condemnation of war does not exclude a need for a way to discern if an armed conflict is morally justifiable and how to proceed in such a case. Recognizing the inviolable right of nations to self-defence, the pastoral constitution *Gaudium et Spes* does not acquiesce to the inevitability of war, nor does it provide justification for the use of force, nor does it reject non-violent methods of resolving disputes (Floerke–Scheid, 2018, 270–276).

2.2. *The prophetic call to peace*

Since the Second Vatican Council, there has been both a gradual development and a paradigm shift toward an anti-war stance in the discourse on the justification of war and just peace. The Church addressed the world in a measured tone, at once calling for an earnest effort towards peace, but without providing anyone with either a moral or ideological pretext for war. On the other hand, the work of theologians such as Johann Baptist Metz supported a more resolute opposition to war and its underlying causes. In his new political theology, Metz employed the concept of *memoria passionis* to express a consciousness of an already ongoing catastrophic history of suffering and death, especially in the name of the “mortal god” of the state. Metz protests the mythologization of history and cultural amnesia, which enable the victims of war and any other injustice to be forgotten. In this he was partially inspired by Walter Benjamin (Metz, 2004, 67–77; 138–140; 221–230).

According to Agata Bielik–Robson, Benjamin adopts an “antinomic” understanding of history to critique the established interpretations of the past and to resurrect what has been suppressed and forgotten. Benjamin understands the *nomos* of this world as a rigid legalistic rationality anchored in “myth”, i.e., in distortion of divine revelation. Instead of life, “myth” proclaims death as the inavoidable fate of mankind. *Nomos* usurps the power over life and death to, through the rule of law, impose guilt upon humanity. Alternatively, authentic divine justice ensures redemption (Bielik–Robson, 2017, 115–118; 120–122). In that spirit, Benjamin in his essay *Critique of Violence*, interprets the Fifth Commandment of the Decalogue: »You shall not murder«, not as a prohibition or condemnation of killing but as God’s own *ethos*, according to which He restrains himself from inflicting such a fate on mankind. Man alone decides against or in

favour of violence towards others, including all the consequences of this moral decision. Benjamin (1996, 248–252) merely asks what kind of a world it would be if the use of force was not necessary for the legitimacy of government, and whether encounters with others would still imply the risk of violence?

Echoing Benjamin and Metz, Pope Francis also argues that awaiting the eschaton does not entail passivity in regard to achieving peace here and now. He repeatedly emphasizes the necessity for solidarity when faced with pressing challenges in this globalized, yet divided world, torn apart by conflict. Already in the apostolic exhortation *Evangelii Gaudium* the Pope hinges achieving peace on justice and brotherhood, as well as a global »culture of encounter« (EG 218–220). The Holy Father does not advocate for a mere increase in material quality of life by securing advantageous geopolitical conditions for international business but for an integral development of local communities, peoples, and the whole world with just peace as a goal (Turner, 2017, 113–124). In the spirit of social doctrine and the mission of the Church in the world, Pope Francis promotes restraint in the use of force and non-violent conflict resolution while de-emphasizing the contentious question of “just war”. As the vicar of Christ, the Pope is bound to fulfil the prophetic aspect of his office by always pointing toward the fullness of eschatological peace and justice in the Kingdom of Heaven (Braun, 2018, 2–10; 16–19).

Conclusion

Despite his “bellicose” concept of the political and the consequent inevitability of war, one cannot consider the political theology of Carl Schmitt to be explicitly warmongering. After all, Schmitt does advocate for the regulation of conduct in war. However, his pessimism concerning human nature and the criterion of the political, which emphasizes the ever-present potential for conflict, undermine any claim that violence in war can be rationalized. Although the “mortal god” of the state suppresses political violence and approaches the issue of war with the utmost gravity, it is Schmitt’s very notion of sovereignty which guarantees there will be no restraint or respect for human dignity. The undisputable supremacy of political power and authority inevitably encourages imperialist pretensions.

Schmitt’s perspective leaves no place for naïveté regarding the possibility of permanent peace in the near future. And the same can be said for cynical geopolitical feuding. Now, when every war has global implications, the unremitting striving for peace has become a necessity purely for the reason of survival. Schmitt’s criterion of the political above all serves as a warning. Humanity is capable of destroying itself even without weapons of mass destruction. Another reason why Schmitt’s limiting of Christ’s commandment of love is problematic is the following: if one truly accepts such a limitation when it comes to international politics, then legal regulation or any other attempt to restrict or suppress conflict will not postpone the apocalypse of “total war”.

Therefore, it is understandable why the advocates of Christian pacifism criticize the Church for still holding on to the idea of “just war”, thereby undermining non-violent ways of securing a just peace. However, they disregard the fact that war is first and foremost an expression of human nature wounded by sin and the consequent distancing from God which then leads to the ontologization of political identities. Although laudable, activist advocacy for a just peace cannot genuinely end political friction. The promotion of non-violent conflict resolution and social reform will not change human nature, nor the unspoken aspiration of all politics, including war: to achieve a kind of apotheosis, a universal sovereignty.

Still, this does not entail passivity or even fatalism when it comes to world peace. The Catholic Church cautions against the deeper structural causes of war and urges the international community to embrace solidarity and cooperation. Cultivating “the culture of encounter” would counter the narrow-mindedness that designates one’s neighbour as an enemy and a threat to the security of the state. The intention of the Church is not to preserve the national sovereignty of any country, nor to promote a unifying world order that would guarantee lasting peace. Carl Schmitt endeavoured to make war a serious but sustainable form of political action through legal regulation, yet another tool at the disposal of the “mortal god” of the state. The purpose of the just war doctrine held by the Church is not to make armed conflict morally acceptable, but to remind how scandalous war really is and to call for intervention for the sake of peace. War must not and cannot be normalized. At the core of all Church efforts is a messianic hope which is neither a catechonic postponement of “total war”, nor the idealism of a social activist. Rather, it is a »voice crying in the wilderness« (cf. Mk 1:3; Mt 3:3; Lk 3:4; Jn 1:23), calling for repentance and reconciliation, possibly in vain, but by no means without reason.

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*Nečovječnost rata i krhkost mira u svjetlu političke teologije i socijalnoga nauka Crkve**Mirko Vlk***Sažetak*

Carl Schmitt u svojoj političkoj teologiji razumije suverenost kao sekularnu analogiju Božje transcendencije na kojoj počiva legitimnost političke vlasti. Zbog polemičke naravi politike nemoguće je izbjeći uspostavu neosporenoga autoriteta i moć države kao Hobbesova “smrtnoga boga”. Budući da je temeljni kriterij političkoga raspoznavanje između prijatelja i neprijatelja, zadaća države nije samo spriječiti političko nasilje među građanima, nego i donijeti presudnu odluku o proglašenju rata i sklapanju mira s drugim nacijama. Kako je rat pitanje opstanka, država ne može tu odgovornost odbaciti ili prenijeti na drugoga. Stoga je trajni mir nemoguć, ali se postupanje u ratu može regulirati te tako spriječiti “totalni rat”. Katolička crkva pak osuđuje nečovječnost rata i gomilanje oružja masovnoga uništenja te poziva na izgradnju zajednice naroda koja bi se vodila međusobnom solidarnošću, a ne geopolitičkim interesima. No Crkva se opet nije odrekla svojega tradicionalnoga nauka o pravednom ratu zbog još uvijek prevladavajuće sklonosti k upotrebi sile kao sredstva rješavanja političkih sporova. Ipak, Crkva se u okviru svojih napora oko promicanja društvene pravednosti ne susteže ohrabrivati nenasilne načine smirivanja i razrješavanja sukoba. Predanost Katoličke crkve miru u svijetu izričaj je njezine eshatološke nade, iščekivanja Kraljevstva Božjega u kojem pravda i mir neće biti tek odsustvo nasilja.

Ključne riječi: politička teologija; rat; mir; Carl Schmitt; Katolička crkva; nauk o pravednom ratu; kršćanski pacifizam

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