REFORMING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VIA LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES – THE CASE OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.25234/pv/5162

Keywords:

Sarbanes-Oxley Act, optimal-legislation, lawmaking, efficiency of law, efficacy of law

Abstract

The scope of this paper is to evaluate the Sarbanes-Oxley Act from a legislative theoretical point of view with the aid of showing some theories on legislation, a field which came to the forefront of jurisprudence in relatively recent times in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The intention is to show that Sarbanes-Oxley Act was a piece of suboptimal legislation, by comparing and contrasting it to some normative theories.

Author Biography

András Kecskés, Department of Business and Commercial Law, Faculty of Law, University of Pécs. H-7622 Pécs, 48-as tér1., Hungary

PhD, Associate Professor

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Published

2017-12-21

Issue

Vol. 33 No. 3-4 (2017)

Section

Professional article

License

Copyright (c) 2017 András Kecskés

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Authors retain the copyright on the papers published in the Journal, but grant the right of first publication to the Journal. Papers accepted for publication or already published in Pravni vjesnik of the Faculty of Law in Osijek may be published by the author(s) in other publications only with proper notice of its previous publication in Pravni vjesnik.