FORMING A GOVERNMENT IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE – A PROPOSAL FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

Abstract

The paper deals with some open constitutional issues that have caused different interpretations and disputes in the professional public in the process of constituting the Croatian Parliament and the formation of the government in the Republic of Croatia, especially in light of the experience after the parliamentary elections held in November 2015. Based on comparative experiences with constitutional regulations of the process of government formation in some European countries, certain changes of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia are proposed. Firstly, it would be necessary to prescribe the deadline for the Parliament to be constituted, after the parliamentary elections, as well as the deadlines for the implementation of various procedures for giving mandate to form government (or giving a vote of confidence in proposed government or the president of the government). Furthermore, the process of forming a government should be made easier and, unlike the current solution, it should be possible to form also a minority government. Certainly, a constitutional solution should be sought, whereby the confidence of a simple majority of MPs would be sufficient, ultimately, to form a government, so that the repetition of parliamentary elections would not be the only option for solving the crisis of government formation. Additionally, in the process of forming a government, the role of the Croatian Parliament should be strengthened, and the role of the head of state should be reduced. This can be achieved by enabling a certain number of MPs to propose candidates for the Prime Minister. It is also proposed to delete the constitutional provision from Article 112 according to which the President of the Republic has the power to appoint a provisional non-partisan government in the event that he has not assigned a mandate to form government, i.e. no candidate has the confidence of the majority of deputies. However, the President of the Republic would still have the power to announce early elections if the Parliament does not constitute itself or in case no government could be formed. The paper also presents a proposal for the possible introduction of the constructive vote of no-confidence.