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Freedom of the Will, Causality and Hume

Davor Pećnjak orcid.org/0000-0001-9506-053X ; Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska

Sažetak

In this article, I try to show that if we analyse causality in terms of perceiving regular succession of events in which one event is followed by another, and if we do not perceive further "necessity" by which these regular events be necessitated in the sense that they must always be as they are and how we perceive them, like David Hume did, then there is a possibility that there is no kind of necessity and that this analysis can be used to support libertarianism concerning free will problem, and not as a support to compatibilism, which was held by Hume. I also try to show, contra Hume, that there are chance events and that under certain circumstances, similar causes can have very different effects.

Ključne riječi

Causality; empiricism; Hume; libertarianism; necessity

Hrčak ID:

74468

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/74468

Datum izdavanja:

30.11.2011.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 3.399 *