Original scientific paper
Petrić's Interpretation of Aristotele's Definition of the Subject of the Theory of Science (Mathematics, Metaphysics)
Mihaela Girardi-Karšulin
; Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska
Abstract
The focus of Petrić's critique, an interpretation of Aristotele's philosophy, represent's Petrić's interpretation of Aristotle's definition of science, especially the subject of Metaphysics. Petrić intends to prove that science, within the framework of Aristotle's study, is itself contradictory. Aristotle does not define an adequate subject of science as Aristotle's scientific methods merely open the field of the doxic, Aristotle's division of science (especially theoretical sciences) is unacceptable if examined critically.
Petrić establishes Aristotle's science as a whole as opinion (δόξα).Since Petrić's entire interpretation of Aristotle leads towards the horizon of »Christian philosophy«, towards a horizon of a possible relation between reason (Aristotlism) and faith, the following conclusion arises: Petrić, by interpreting Aristotle's philosophy, is reducing science as an opinion (mnijenje) to a Christianly established relationship of reason and faith to the relationship of opinion and faith. With regard for the need of a new definition of reason - as science and not opinion – a new interpretation is sought for the relation between reason and faith.
This thought of Petrić's, which is not utterly explicated, seems at the same time to be the most contested within the framework of Christian thinking. Although unexplicated, it is certainly disputable even to Petrić himself, in a sense, because Petrić is trying to present it using an acceptable procedure which we attempt to define in this paper as »aristotleization of Platonism«. In this sense, i. e. as »aristotleization of Platonism« one can, certainly, interpret Petrić's interpretation of Aristotle's plagiate, i. e. his attempt at integrating Aristotle's individual teachings into Platonism, but first of all we have interpretation according to which value (i. e. truthfulness) of Plato's studies (pre-Socratic and »old« that Petrić grasps as a unity of tradition of truthful nd eternal philosophy) are shown on the basis of Aristotle's own principles.
The central position in this complex is held by Petrić's interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics.
Petrić first contends that Metaphysics is not a single science, that it does not have a single subject, rather that it is a conglomerate of several sciences. No cohesion of subject is achieved in Metaphysics - and it is not even intended. Since it is not a single science, it can not have a single name. And since one part of Metaphysics (some of the volumes) debate on subjects that are before natural things (in dignity) - this part could be called »Antephysics«. The second books debate on the being as a being and they are called, by Petrić: »De ente« (Knowledge) On the Being. Petrić places the brunt of his debate on proving the impossibi1ity of cohesion between antephysics and de ente, the impossibility of these two being a single science. The impossibi1ity of this cohesion is based, however, on Aristotle's own concept, on his original theses.
The basic thesis on which the lack of cohesion in Metaphysics is based, the impossibility of the existence of a science of metaphysics in Metaphysics is, in Petrić's opinion, Aristot1e's teaching according to which the being as being - is the most universal concept, the universal gathered from the individual on the basis of abstraction. The being as being, the most universal concept, seems to Petrić as ens rationis, that is the non-real being. Such a non-real being can not, with the subject of antephysics (wisdom - Aristotle) as a real and supernatural subject, represent the cohesive subject of a single science. To the contrary, the being as being in the Platonic sense as a truthful of real being, i. e. an idea (and not a general concept) is the same as the super-natural or ante-natural being and with it represents a cohesive (and scientific) subject.
In his interpretation of Aristotle's definition of the being as being as the most universal concept, in antithesis on the one hand towards the antique and most of the medieval commentators on Aristotle, on the other hand he is building on a nomina1ist interpretation. In the totality of his deduction and with regards to the (postulated) intention - the »Aristotelization of Platonism«, Petrić is original.
Keywords
Hrčak ID:
84890
URI
Publication date:
7.12.1987.
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