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Quine on Objects and De Re Modality

Antti Keskinen ; University of Tampere

Sažetak

Th is paper discusses Quine’s argument against quantifi ed modal logic and de re necessity from the point of view of his epistemological conception of objects as posits. Quine’s argument is based on an illustration of the interference of descriptive specifications of an object in purported de re modal judgments. Quine thinks this sort of interference shows that the notion of necessity does not apply to the fulfi llment of conditions by objects at all. To Quine’s argument it may be replied that he is only making a meaning-theoretic or an epistemological point that need not have any metaphysical implications. However, in this paper it is argued that Quine’s epistemology involves a conception of objects as theory-dependent and inseparable from descriptive conditions. It is argued that Quine’s conception of objects makes the interference of
descriptive content in purported de re modal judgments unavoidable.

Ključne riječi

Quine; modality; epistemology; modal logic; theory of meaning; theory of reference

Hrčak ID:

98263

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/98263

Datum izdavanja:

1.2.2013.

Posjeta: 2.115 *