Bogoslovska smotra, Vol. 84 No. 1, 2014.
Izvorni znanstveni članak
The Argument from Knowledge and the Modal Argument for Dualism in the Philosophy of Mind
Davor Pećnjak
orcid.org/0000-0001-9506-053X
; Institut za filozofiju, Zagreb, Hrvatska
Ivan Špiljak
Sažetak
A discussion on the soul is one of the traditional discussions in theology and philosophy. The contemporary philosophy also uses the term ‘mind’ to signify the totality of psychological or mental abilities of the human being. In this article, the authors present and discuss the problem of the relation of the soul or mind and the body, that is, the question how is the soul or mind constituted. One of the oldest pre-philosophical intuitions is that the mind and the body are made of two different ‘materials’: the body is made of matter, while the soul or the mind is made of something immaterial or non-physical. This conclusion is also confirmed by a common reflection on properties which are attributed to material objects, on the one hand, and mental states and processes on the other. However, the philosophical arguments on this position are much stronger. The authors will present and discuss so-called ‘Argument from Knowledge’ and the ‘Modal Argument’ for dualism in the contemporary philosophy. By rejecting some objections, these arguments, although not the only ones in favour of dualism in the philosophy of mind, are quite strong and acceptable statements in favour of nonphysicality of the mind or the soul.
Ključne riječi
Soul; mind; dualism; argument from knowledge; modal argument; twodimensional semantics; physicalism
Hrčak ID:
120280
URI
Datum izdavanja:
24.4.2014.
Posjeta: 2.406 *