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Not So Dangerous Liaisons: Toward a Socioeconomic Model of Institutional Change

Velimir Šonje ; Narodna banka Hrvatske
Aleksandar Štulhofer orcid.org/0000-0001-5138-3644 ; Filozofski fakultet, Zagreb

Sažetak

Institutions constrain (individual and collective) actions and impose internal and external constraints on rational outcomes. The bonding strength of informal institutions depends on the degree of internalization of norms among individuals and communities. Therefore differences in behavior can be explained by differences in the degrees of internalization of norms. Differing degrees of internalization are due to differing levels of usefulness of norms in different social situations. If any norm proves not to be useful in certain social situations, the degree of its internalization declines, and vice versa. However, a norm can not quickly disappear simply because it proved to be not useful in a few social situations; it has to prove its lack of usefulness over a long period of time and in a wide range of social situations in order to disappear: Therefore, different social situations make tests and induce evolution of norms. Formal institutions are based upon informal norms. If the latter are deeply internalized, formal institutions built upon them will be stable, will change in small evolutionary steps, and will strongly resist any exogenous and violent changes, and vice versa. Horizontal institutions support and encourage cooperation among social actors, and vertical institutions erode cooperation. Any set of deeply internalized informal norms shared by members of any community is community-specific capital we label socio-cultural capital.

Ključne riječi

rational choice; norms; informal and formal institutions; sociocultural capital; institutional changes; sociology and economics

Hrčak ID:

154572

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/154572

Datum izdavanja:

31.12.1995.

Podaci na drugim jezicima: hrvatski

Posjeta: 1.338 *