Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.31337/oz.72.2.1
A Critique of Antinomies as Justification for the Usual Interpretation of Kant’s Epistemology
Hrvoje Juko
; Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Rim, Italija
Sažetak
The transcendental ideality of the objects of cognition is an essential part of Kant’s
epistemology — at least, in its usual interpretation. In this article, the author proposes
that (precisely because of the transcendental ideality thesis), the usual interpretation
of Kant’s epistemology (UIKE) suffers from problems of incoherence, and
plausibly so, and so is not clearly justified. In response to the suggestion that antinomies
justify UIKE, the author claims that at least one antinomy should then be
rationally compulsive, however, not one of them is. The author, therefore, concludes
that antinomies do not justify UIKE and, that if antinomies are the only justification
for UIKE, then it is not justified.
Ključne riječi
Immanuel Kant; Critique of Pure Reason; transcendental idealism; usual interpretation of Kant’s epistemology; antinomies; rational compulsivity; justification
Hrčak ID:
184140
URI
Datum izdavanja:
10.7.2017.
Posjeta: 2.320 *