Izvorni znanstveni članak
Reception of Ulpian’s definition of justice in Croatian medieval sources
Marko Petrak
Sažetak
The aim of the article is to analyze the reception of the famous Ulpian’s definition of justice (Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi – Digesta 1.1.10) in Croatian medieval sources. In order to reveal all the essential nuances of meaning contained in this definition as it was interpreted in the period under consideration, the author analyses its original meaning in classical Roman law, with a special emphasis on its conceptual foundations in Roman philosophical tradition. In the central part of the article, the important role of this definition an its paraphrases in proemia of several medieval Dalmatian (Dubrovnik, Brač, Hvar) and Istrian (Novigrad, Poreč) statutes are analyzed, comparing their concepts of justice (iustitia) with concepts elaborated in the works of glossators (Irnerius, Bulgarus, Placentius, Asus). The same analysis is applied to Ulpian’s definitions of justice and its fragments in continental Croatia, which can be found in the arenga of documents of Hungarian-Croatian kings (e.g. Andrew II, Béla IV, Mathias Corvinus), and later in the Acts of lower levels of government (e.g. Slavonian bans). Based on this analysis, the author concludes that, in the world of medieval law, Ulpian’s definition of justice developed in the direction which was far from its original meaning. Only its external form (nuda verba) remained, with a completely new meaning. As opposed to the Roman philosophical and legal tradition, the virtue of justice in no longer seen as an insight into the natural order of things where every individual can understand who is entitled to which right on the basis of reason. The medieval justice is a suprarational and transcendental category, and its first source is Christian God. According to the ideal conceptions expressed in the analyzed sources, rulers- legislators are the living embodiment of divine justice as mediators of this virtue to men by means of laws which assign appropriate rights to everybody (lex animata in terries). Individuals can be just only if they obey laws established by rulers. In the end, the author analyses the interpretation of Ulpian’s definition of justice in the prologue of Wörbeczy’s Tripartite, and concludes that in this source Ulpian’s definition is not interpreted any longer exclusively in the sacral and transcendental context, but the virtue of justice is understood again as an ethical category which an individual can understand by rational insight; the impact of the Renaissance concept should not be underestimated in this respect.
Ključne riječi
Ulpian; justice; Roman law; Middle Ages; Croatia
Hrčak ID:
18244
URI
Datum izdavanja:
18.12.2007.
Posjeta: 3.997 *