Izvorni znanstveni članak

https://doi.org/10.1080/1331677X.2019.1678503

Executive remuneration determinants: New evidence from meta-analysis

Fábian Blanes ; Facultat D’Economia, Universitat de València, València, Spain
Cristina de Fuentes ; Facultat D’Economia, Universitat de València, València, Spain
Rubén Porcuna ; Facultat D’Economia, Universitat de València, València, Spain

Sažetak

This meta-analysis takes stock of 121 C.E.O. pay studies published between 1998 and 2018 with the objective of identifying the main drivers of C.E.O. pay from a global perspective and contributing to the agency vs managerial debate on this ground. The meta-results disclose a positive C.E.O. pay–performance correlation (the highest correlation coefficient corresponds to Earnings per share with a 34%) as the agency theory prescribes and the governance policies promote. However, firm size still predominates as the main driver of C.E.O. pay (correlation coefficient is around 44%) according to managerial premises. Moreover, our results reconcile both approaches because results of the meta-regressions suggest that larger companies and more independent boards strengthen the pay–performance association. Additional analyses of moderating factors on C.E.O. pay forces do not provide robust conclusions, though, they suggest: (1) weak impact, if any, of both the Cadbury Report and the S.O.X.; and (2) lack of homogeneity in the banking industry despite its specific regulation.

Ključne riječi

C.E.O. compensation; C.E.O. pay; pay–performance; corporate governance; managerial power theory; meta-analysis

Hrčak ID:

229840

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/229840

Datum izdavanja:

9.2.2021.

Posjeta: 2.597 *