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Original scientific paper

KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM IN MORAL THEORY

John Rawls


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Abstract

The author outlines the chief features of the constructivist moral conception in its Kantian variant and argues that such a moral conception had been unjustifiably looked over in relation to the traditional moral conceptions such as utilitariarism, intuitionism and perfectionism. The central idea of Kantian constructivism is linking certain notions of the person and principles of justice that should regulate basic social institutions by means of the constructivist procedure. The author’s starting point is the conception of moral persons as free and equal. He claims that an appropriate connection among thus perceived persons and the first principles of justice is established in such a way that the first principles are chosen under reasonable conditions in which individuals possess solely such qualities. The reasonable conditions consist of the symmetrical situatedness of the “choosers”, the veil of ignorance (which obscures the morally irrelevant features of persons’ attributes) and the publicity condition. The author’s goal is to reach a proper viewpoint on the basis of which citizens are to judge their fundamental social institutions and in that way achieve consensus on the need for and the direction of their reform.

Keywords

Kant; Kantian constructivism; moral theory; principles of justice; veil of ignorance

Hrčak ID:

22647

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/22647

Publication date:

23.5.2005.

Article data in other languages: croatian

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