Izvorni znanstveni članak
On a Consequence in a Broad Sense
Danilo Šuster
orcid.org/0000-0002-3894-1805
; University of Maribor, Maribor, Slovenia
Sažetak
Cogency is the central normative concept of informal logic. But it is a loose evaluative concept and I argue that a generic notion covering all of the qualities of a well-reasoned argument is the most plausible conception. It is best captured by the standard RSA criterion: in a good argument, acceptable (A) and relevant (R) premises provide sufficient (S) grounds for the conclusion. Logical qualities in a broad sense are affected by the epistemic qualities of the premises and “consequence” in a broad sense exhibits an interplay of form and content. There are four proposals for the premise—conclusion relation: (i) no strictly logical connection (“non-logical” consequence); (ii) one type of connection only (deductivism); (iii) a few types of connection (deduction, induction, perhaps conduction and analogical reasoning); (iv) many types of connection (argumentation schemes). Deductivism is a serious option but in its strong version, as the discussion about petitio shows, it fails to establish that arguments which are not cogent are thereby invalid. And weak deductivism, very attractive from the pedagogical point of view, has some deficiencies (implausible hidden premises; preservation of truth, not probability). I argue that the idea of a counterexample, when we regard certain components of the argument as fixed and others as variable, is the best approach to the analysis of the illative core of every-day arguments (the approach of David Hitchcock on material consequence).
Ključne riječi
Informal logic, consequence, begging the question, cogency, deductivism, counterexample
Hrčak ID:
253574
URI
Datum izdavanja:
20.12.2018.
Posjeta: 385 *