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Croatian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 20 No. 59, 2020.

Izvorni znanstveni članak

Democracy, Truth, and Epistemic Proceduralism

Ivan Mladenović orcid id orcid.org/0000-0001-6443-0884 ; University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia

Puni tekst: engleski pdf 109 Kb

str. 171-182

preuzimanja: 151

citiraj

Sažetak

The usual justifications of democracy attach central importance to fair decision-making procedures. However, it is being increasingly emphasized that it is necessary to address epistemic considerations to justify democracy and democratic authority. In her book Democracy and Truth: The Conflict between Political and Epistemic Virtues, Prijić-Samaržija defends the view which places emphasis on the necessity of epistemic justification of democracy. In this paper, I will discuss her criticism of epistemic proceduralism, which can be considered major contemporary framework for epistemic justification of democracy. Within the framework of epistemic proceduralism, for justifying democracy and democratic authority it is necessary to take into account both political and epistemic values. Nevertheless, Prijić-Samaržija thinks that epistemic proceduralism is not sufficiently epistemic and that it reduces epistemic to political values. I shall argue that epistemic proceduralism can be defended from this kind of criticism.

Ključne riječi

Democracy; truth; correctness; legitimacy; democratic authority; epistemic proceduralism.

Hrčak ID:

253653

URI

https://hrcak.srce.hr/253653

Datum izdavanja:

14.7.2020.

Posjeta: 709 *