Kratko priopćenje
https://doi.org/10.31820/ejap.17.1.9
Motivational Internalism and The Second-Order Desire Explanation
Xiao Zhang
orcid.org/0000-0002-2841-7073
Sažetak
Both motivational internalism and externalism need to explain why sometimes moral judgments tend to motivate us. In this paper, I argue that Dreier’ second-order desire model cannot be a plausible externalist alternative to explain the connection between moral judgments and motivation. I explain that the relevant second-order desire is merely a constitutive requirement of rationality because that desire makes a set of desires more unified and coherent. As a rational agent with the relevant second-order desire is disposed towards coherence, she will have some motivation to act in accordance with her moral judgments. Dreier’s second-order desire model thus collapses into a form of internalism and cannot be a plausible externalist option to explain the connection between moral judgments and motivation.
Ključne riječi
Motivational internalism; externalism; second-order desire; practical rationality
Hrčak ID:
261267
URI
Datum izdavanja:
5.2.2021.
Posjeta: 1.499 *