Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.22.64.1
Is Representationalism Committed to Colour Physicalism?
Daniel Mario Weger
orcid.org/0000-0002-8681-1650
; Institute for Philosophy, Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main
Sažetak
The circularity problem states that the representationalist about phenomenal consciousness gives a circular explanation if she adopts the classic view about secondary qualities, such as colours, that characterises them as dispositions to produce experiences with a specifi c phenomenal character. Since colour primitivism faces severe diffi culties, it seems that colour physicalism is the only viable option for the representationalist. I will argue that the representationalist is not committed to colour physicalism because she can adopt an anti-realist theory of colour. My diagnosis is that the alleged commitment to colour physicalism rests upon the acceptance of colour realism which is due to the approval of externalist versions of representationalism, such as tracking representationalism. I will argue that the representationalist can deal with the circularity problem by adopting figurative projectivism, which holds that colours are contingently non-instantiated properties that only figure in the representational contents of colour experiences.
Ključne riječi
Representationalism about phenomenal consciousness; secondary qualities; circularity problem; colour physicalism; colour projectivism.
Hrčak ID:
278877
URI
Datum izdavanja:
7.6.2022.
Posjeta: 570 *