Izvorni znanstveni članak
https://doi.org/10.52685/cjp.22.64.2
Epistemic Priority or Aims of Research? A Critique of Lexical Priority of Truth in Regulatory Science
Joby Varghese
orcid.org/0000-0002-3108-3406
; Indian Institute of Technology Jammu, Jammu & Kashmir, India
Sažetak
A general criterion for distinguishing between epistemic and non-epistemic values is that the former promotes the attainment of truth whereas the latter does not. Daniel Steel (2010, 2016) is a proponent of this criterion, although it was initially proposed by McMullin (1983). There are at least two consequences of this criterion; (i) it always prioritizes epistemic values over non-epistemic values in scientific research, and (ii) it overlooks the diverse aims of science, especially the aims of regulatory or policy-oriented science. This criterion assumes the lexical priority of truth or lexical priority of evidence. This paper attempts to show a few inadequacies of this assumption. The paper also demonstrates why epistemic priority over non-epistemic values is a problematic stance and how constraining the role of non-epistemic values as ‘tiebreakers’ may undermine the diverse aims of science.
Ključne riječi
Science and values; epistemic values; lexical priority of truth; non-epistemic values; aims of science.
Hrčak ID:
278878
URI
Datum izdavanja:
7.6.2022.
Posjeta: 648 *